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The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to
Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship
Model of Criminal Procedure
MARGARET RAYMONDt
INTRODUCTION

The law of criminal procedure is shaped by the
suppression motion. Courts, naturally reluctant to grant
the suppression of relevant and probative evidence,
invariably apply the law with an eye to the outcome. The
desire to attend to results produces criminal procedure
doctrine that can be, in many contexts, decidedly
ungenerous to defendants. At the same time, the courts for
the most part believe in, and want to reaffirm, positive law
that honors the American commitment to the autonomy and
privacy of its citizenry with respect to the police. The
protections of the criminal procedure amendments are
distinctive markers of liberty, and the courts persistently
articulate a vision that accords those protections significant
weight.
The courts' need to articulate an expansive vision of
constitutional protection while at the same time producing
desirable outcomes has generated doctrine that places the
responsibility for maximizing constitutional freedoms in the
hands of the defendant. An individual faced with an
encounter with a police officer can protect his rights, but he
must behave in a distinctive fashion to do so. Under
existing doctrine, the defendant's loss of his constitutional
freedoms often becomes, as a constitutional matter, his own
fault. It is not that the defendant could not have protected
his privacy, but that under the circumstances he has failed
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to take the necessary steps-to say or do the right thingthat would have protected it. The correct behavior, which
maximizes the defendant's constitutional protection, often
has two distinguishing characteristics: it is counterintuitive,
and demands that the individual demonstrate an
extraordinary and unlikely degree of assertiveness,
autonomy, and empowerment.
The result is a curious product: what I call the
"gamesmanship" model of criminal procedure. The model
does three things. First, it defines rules that place the
responsibility to protect rights on the defendants
themselves. Second, it applies those rules so that the loss of
rights is understood as the product of defendant-centered
decisions like consent, compliance, or voluntary cooperation
rather than police conduct. Last of all, it suggests that,
because the result is the product of the defendant's own
choices, the outcome is both reasonable and adequately
protective of individual rights. In some cases, the courts
even describe the way the defendant should have behaved if
he wanted to protect his Fourth Amendment rights and
avoid the ultimate seizure of evidence.
It is not only the courts that accept the gamesmanship
model. The government, in turn, routinely argues that it is
the individual's responsibility to avoid, defuse, or refuse
interactions with police that lead to the seizure of
contraband or evidence.
A distinctive example of the gamesmanship model is
provided by the law governing so-called consensual
encounters with police. The consensual encounter, which is
deemed to be outside the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, is defined as an encounter that a reasonable
person would feel free to decline. The legal standard is thus
defined in terms of how citizens should behave, rather than
how the police should. The courts take an extremely
expansive view of the reasonable person's capacity to
decline such encounters, and consider a defendant's failure
to express an affirmative refusal to comply the equivalent of
voluntary compliance. It then becomes the defendant's
failure to refuse the encounter that justifies the loss of
constitutional protections.
The consensual encounter context reflects the profound
pitfalls of the gamesmanship model. First, the model makes
the courts and the government advocate for the view that
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reasonable people can and should decline to cooperate with
police. Moreover, it suggests that the smart defendant-the
good player-invokes that right and refuses cooperation.
The cooperator winds up portrayed as a fool or a sucker,
someone who foolishly but willingly relinquished his right
to be left alone. While in the context of suppression motions
this may produce admissible evidence, in the long run this
approach disregards the socially beneficial goal of
encouraging citizens to cooperate with police. It is,
moreover, inconsistent with the government's much more
constrained view of the individual's right to refuse an
encounter with police in other contexts, as, for example,
when it seeks to prosecute an individual for violation of a
statute criminalizing failure to cooperate with police.
Second, the model causes the courts, and ultimately the
law, to focus on questions of how individuals should behave
rather than how police should. The criminal procedure area
creates a unique opportunity to focus attention on the
reasonableness
of law enforcement behavior.
The
gamesmanship model, and its focus on the defendant,
abdicates the courts' role in articulating the appropriate
parameters of constitutional reasonableness for law
enforcement behavior in a free society.
Implicitly, many courts recognize this in their analysis
of consensual encounter cases. While claiming to apply the
traditional standards of the gamesmanship model and to
focus on how the reasonable person would feel under the
circumstances, many courts in fact look to whether police,
in their view, have behaved appropriately, or to whether
there has been police overreaching. This attention to police
behavior has a significant analogue in the Fifth
Amendment Due Process cases, where a conclusion that a
statement is involuntary and constitutionally inadmissible
requires a finding that there has been police overreaching.
This Article concludes that the courts, in fact, are applying
a more appropriate standard than the one they purport to
apply. A standard that focuses on police wrongdoing rather
than citizen failure is the appropriate way to counter the
gamesmanship model in the context of the consensual
encounter.
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I. THE GAMESMANSHIP MODEL AND THE CONSENSUAL
ENCOUNTER

A. Understandingthe Consensual Encounter
To understand how the gamesmanship model works, it
is first necessary to understand the context in which we will
consider it-the consensual encounter.
Under the Fourth Amendment, police encounters with
individuals are governed by a rubric in which particular
levels of suspicion are required before certain categories of
encounter are permissible. This framework creates a sort of
constitutional quantum mechanics, establishing three
levels of intervention and a required level of suspicion
associated with each level. An intervention that exceeds the
parameters of its level without a concomitant increase in
the level of suspicion is impermissible.
Under this framework, probable cause justifies the
arrest of a suspect, and reasonable suspicion justifies a
"stop"-an intermediate interaction, short of arrest, and
constrained in both duration and scope. When a police
officer has no articulable suspicion at all about an
individual, the officer may initiate what the courts have
termed a "consensual encounter." Police are free to initiate
a consensual encounter with an individual for any reason or
no reason, perhaps based on a whim or a "hunch" that
cannot be supported by specific and articulable facts.
What can police do in a consensual encounter? In
theory, without individualized suspicion that a person is
engaging or has engaged in criminal activity, police power
is limited. Officers may not, in the ordinary course,
command or require a person to comply with their
investigatory requests.' But they are free to ask for
voluntary compliance with those requests. Overstepping the

1. Public safety might require a different approach to this problem in some
circumstances; see, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL
3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (upholding suspicionless search of containers
brought onto the New York City subways under the "special needs" doctrine),
affld, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). The analysis here relates to what police may
do in furtherance of investigating an individual's own potentially criminal
behavior.
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bounds of a consensual encounter can turn it into a stop
and render its fruits inadmissible.
The test for whether an encounter is consensual is
whether a reasonable innocent person in the position of the
individual approached would "feel free to decline the
'2
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
The police entitlement to conduct the encounter thus turns
on the notion that the individual subjected to the encounter
is privileged to refuse it; an encounter that is consensual
is,
3
by definition, one a citizen is freely entitled to decline.
Since the individual is constitutionally privileged to
decline the encounter, the consequences of that refusal
should be extremely limited. Courts do less well with this
concept than one might expect. While they regularly
articulate the principle that the refusal to comply with
police requests, standing alone, should not create suspicion
that justifies a stop, 4 they do not always honor it. Courts

2. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
3. Some courts analyze the problem by asking whether an ordinary citizen
could have engaged in behaviors similar to those engaged in by the police. See,
e.g., People v. Luedemann, 828 N.E.2d 355, 360, 365 (Ill. App. 2d 2005) (finding
a seizure where an officer parked his squad car in the middle of the street,
approached defendant's car, and shined a flashlight on it; "private citizens
cannot, and simply do not, stop their cars in the middle of the road and block
traffic under normal circumstances ....
Officer Pate's actions were consistent
with those of a police officer initiating formal contact with a suspect, not those
of a citizen simply stopping to have a conversation with defendant"; "Officer
Pate shined a flashlight around and into [the car]. Again, private citizens do not
behave in this manner."), rev'd, 857 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. 2006); see also State v.
Jackson, 824 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (La. 2002) ("[T]he police do not seize a person
merely by standing approximately 10 feet away and identifying themselves
without taking any additional measures to assert their authority over the
person that he or she would not expect from the encounter if it had occurred
with an ordinary citizen."); Smith v. Florida, 753 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (Altenbernd, Acting C.J., concurring) ("It is helpful to remember
that [a consensual] encounter is permissible and is not regarded as a seizure
because it is the equivalent of two ordinary citizens engaging in a personal
discussion."). This may be the product of a reference in Professor LaFave's
treatise, where he indicates that "the critical inquiry would be whether the
policeman, although perhaps making inquiries which a private citizen would
not be expected to make, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner
consistent with what would be viewed as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred
between two ordinary citizens." 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, §9.2,
at 53 (1978).
4. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) ("[A]ny 'refusal to
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
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routinely permit failure to comply to be considered in
assessing whether there was adequate suspicion to support
a stop. 5 Ironically, courts sometimes rely upon this
privileged refusal to decline the police encounter as the sole
justification for a stop. 6 Police, even less impressed with

justification needed for a detention or seizure."') (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 437 (1991)); see also Brown v. State, 714 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) ("The mere fact that a citizen refuses to comply with an officer's
request in a consensual encounter cannot be sufficient to provide the officer
with reasonable suspicion . . . ."); Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 157 (Colo.
2001) ("[W]hen a police officer approaches an individual in a public place and
seeks to ask him questions, the individual may ignore the officer and proceed on
his way. . . . Accordingly, the fact that Outlaw and his companions began
walking away from the patrol car after one of them apparently noticed the car
fails to provide reasonable suspicion."); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 776 N.E.2d
1039 (Table), No. 01-P-310, 2002 WL 31322649 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002)
("[T]he defendant's refusal to stop and talk to the officers when Officer Dunn
stated 'stop-we're police officers-we want to talk to you,' may not be
considered in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop him.
When police officers have no reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, it is
a defendant's right to ignore the officer ....
As a result, in such a situation,
refusing to answer an officer's initial questions 'cannot provide reasonable
suspicion for justification of a detention or seizure."') (quoting Commonwealth v.
Barros, 755 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Mass. 2001)).
While the refusal to comply with police requests cannot alone create
reasonable suspicion, whether it can be considered at all-and can add to what
would otherwise be an insufficient quantum of suspicion-is unclear.
5. See, e.g., Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142 (Ky. 1999). An officer
saw Baker standing on the street talking to a known prostitute in a high-crime
area. His hands were in his pockets. The officer asked Baker to remove his
hands from his pockets. He did not do so. The officer then ordered Baker to
remove his hands from his pockets. He did so and threw two items of
contraband to the ground; he was charged with possession of the contraband.
The court concluded that the order to remove his hands from his pockets
constituted a seizure but that, under the circumstances, Baker's refusal to
comply with the request created reasonable suspicion. See generally id. If,
however, there was no suspicion of Baker at the time of the order, Baker was
entitled to refuse to comply with the request that he remove his hands from his
pockets; it is therefore unclear how his failure to do so added to the quantum of
reasonable suspicion. See also United States v. Adams, 137 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247
(W.D.N.Y. 2001).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 2004) (once
defendant fled from an attempt by police to initiate a consensual encounter,
"the officers undoubtedly had reasonable suspicion to pursue Breland in order
to conduct a Terry stop"); United States v. Adams, 137 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) (statement to individual on a bike, "Hey you on the bike," was
an attempt to institute a consensual encounter, but defendant's "subsequent
flight from the encounter on his bicycle," in view of a recent bank robbery,
"created reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot"); State v. Biehl, 2004-
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this principle than the courts, plainly view a failure to
comply as suspicious, and treat resistance to an attempt to
initiate a consensual7 encounter as sufficient to create
reasonable suspicion.
Many encounters between police and individuals on the
street are supported by little or no suspicion at the outset.
The consensual encounter is accordingly the constitutional
framework that governs thousands of daily on-the-street
encounters between police and individuals. The area is
therefore
an appropriately significant
context for
considering the gamesmanship model.
B. The Gamesmanship Model and the Consensual
Encounter: Rules of Reasonableness
As noted in Part I.A, the rule that delineates what
constitutes a consensual encounter is defined in terms of
how reasonable citizens would feel they could respond to
police conduct. What may a police officer who lacks any
articulable suspicion ask without running afoul of the
Fourth Amendment? Anything which a reasonable person
would feel free to decline. Accordingly, rather than defining
the rule in terms of how the officer ought to behave, the law
turns the question around, making the legitimacy of police
action turn on the anticipated perception of the reasonable
person with regard to her right to refuse the interaction.
Suppression motions, accordingly, create curiously
counterintuitive litigation postures. Individuals argue that
Ohio-6532, No. 22054, 2004 WL 2806340, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004)
(noting that part of reasonable suspicion was based on the possibility "that at
least one of these boys, who had already established their belligerence by
refusing to answer [the officer's] questions or consent to the search, might
choose to respond with violence or at least attempt to flee into the surrounding
darkness").
7. See, e.g., State v. Kwiatkowski, 519 S.E.2d 43, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(police called drug dog because individuals, parked "in a 'high drug area' in an
'out-of-state vehicle"' declined permission to search) ("You know, if you're not
holding, you don't say no [to a request to search]. You don't care."). The court
rejected the government's argument that the refusal to consent to a search of
the car provided reasonable suspicion. Id. at 46; see also Graves v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 841-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant, police officer in § 1983
action, argued that one factor giving rise to probable cause to search plaintiffs
backpack was that plaintiff did not consent to search of the backpack; court
held that the factor could not properly be considered in determining probable
cause).
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they lacked free will, that interactions with police were
compelled, and that the situation was coercive. By contrast,
the government argues that reasonable people feel a broad
and profound freedom to decline a wide range of contacts
with police. The litigation positions envision radically
different perceptions of the social context of police-citizen
interaction. To defendants, encounters with police are
displays of hierarchy and authority, in which submission is
required, resistance is dangerous, and requests are really
orders, however politely couched. To the government, in the
suppression context, encounters with police are voluntary
social interactions, in which individuals stand as equals
with police and are free to refuse, resist, or ignore what are
merely invitations to voluntary cooperation.
The courts' inquiry into the reasonable person's view of
the encounter is further encumbered, because the standard
requires them to assess the situation from the perspective
not just of the reasonable person, but the reasonable
innocent person. The justification for this appears to be to
reject the otherwise quite convincing argument that the
suspect must have felt compelled to comply because no
rational person who was concealing contraband would
voluntarily disclose it.8 Accordingly, the standard does not
8. United States v. Perez, 198 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Perez,
who consented to open a cooler and show three law enforcement officers twentysix kilograms of cocaine, argued that he had "no choice" but to comply with the
officer's requests, claiming, "'common sense and ordinary human experience
dictate that no rational person who is knowingly carrying 26 kilograms of
cocaine would willingly consent to a [search]."' Id. The court rejected this
argument on the ground that "the 'reasonable person' test presupposes an
innocent person." Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)).
Without this requirement, many cases make no sense. Consider, for
example, Whisenant v. State, 521 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Mr.
Whisenant and a companion were sitting on a wall in a high crime area. An
officer drove up and asked if he lived there (he answered no), if he had any
identification on him (again, he answered no), and if he had 'any dope, any
guns, anything' on him. Id. at 205. Mr. Whisenant responded that he had a
"shooter" with him, which was understood to mean a crack pipe. Id. The
resulting patdown detected the pipe, which contained cocaine residue, for
possession of which he was convicted. Id. Most people, even if asked, do not
ordinarily volunteer the information that they are in possession of contraband
in an entirely consensual manner. The insistence that courts consider only how
a reasonable innocent person in the situation would feel makes irrelevant the
most rational argument: that people who know they are committing a crime
rarely volunteer that information to police absent some sense of obligation to do
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ask the courts to assess whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's situation would have believed himself free to
decline the encounter, but whether a person who knew
herself to be guilty of nothing would have.
C. The Gamesmanship Model and the Consensual
Encounter:Autonomy and Accountability
As Part .B demonstrates, the standard for the
consensual encounter looks to the expectations of the
reasonable person to define what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment seizure. On its face, the standard itself seems
perhaps overly generous to defendants, because one would
assume that it would treat a large number of interactions
between police and citizens as compelled rather than
consensual. Most people do not, in fact, feel free to walk
away when a police officer has asked them a question or
otherwise indicated a desire for their cooperation, whether
those views are motivated by fear of the consequences, by
simple good manners, or by an internal psychological
compulsion to obey the direction of authority figures.

Before Bostick, judges sometimes acknowledged this. See, e.g., State v.
Waller, No. 1685, 1984 WL 3468, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (Grey, J.,
dissenting) ("I further dissent on the absolutely irrational position taken by the
appellant State of Ohio in this case, i.e. that defendant's actions were
consensual. According to the State's theory Waller voluntarily approached the
police car when called, told the officers what he had, agreed to have it checked
out with the stolen property lists, knowing all the time that he had the right to
refuse to obey the police officer. . . . Thus, under the State's theory, Waller,
knowing he had the right to refuse, that he was not under arrest and that he
could leave at any time, voluntarily turned over property he knew to be stolen
to a police officer. Such a contention boggles the mind!").
Another possible justification for the "reasonable innocent" standard may be
that innocent people are less knowledgeable than others about the practices of
law enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir.
2004). In Williams, police with a drug detection dog allowed the dog to sniff an
individual's waist and groin. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The
defendant argued that this behavior constituted an illegal detention; the dog's
obvious alert meant that he was not free to go. The court concluded that the
benchmark was the perception of an innocent person, and that "[a] reasonable
innocent person in these circumstances would not feel sufficiently accused by
such behavior to transform the encounter into a seizure." Id. at 1275. A dissent
questioned this conclusion: "When, as in this case, a drug dog shoves its nose in
a person's groin, and the person is told that the dog is searching for drugs, the
notion that an innocent person would not feel constrained-but free to leave
unmolested-strains my credulity." Id. at 1276 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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In the context of suppression litigation, however, the
application of that standard produces results entirely
consistent with the gamesmanship model. Courts are quick
to conclude that the reasonable person has-and believes
that he has-an extraordinary amount of freedom to decline
encounters with police. Faced with arguments in
suppression motions that defendants felt that they had no
choice but to cooperate with police under varying
circumstances, the courts describe, at the government's
urging, a free-wheeling universe in which ordinary
individuals regularly turn their backs, and feel free to
decline, ignore, or reject the direction of police.
The hypothetical reasonable person that courts posit in
these cases seems to possess an extraordinarily optimistic
level of autonomy and confidence. This may, in part, be a
function of the fact that judges, whose social status makes
them confident social equals or superiors with regard to law
enforcement, may be singularly uninformed about the
situation of the reasonable person in the ordinary street
encounter. Be that as it may, the reasonable person is, in
the courts' view, a libertarian spirit with nothing to hide,
and a strong and confident certainty of her capacity to
decline a police request. 9
Because the courts take such an expansive view of the
reasonable person's capacity to decline police encounters,
they treat a vast range of such encounters as voluntary and
consensual. In any given case, the defendant's failure to
decline the encounter is invariably the defendant's own
fault-the product of citizen behavior rather than police
behavior.
In the view of the courts, reasonable people feel
compelled to obey the police only when they are ordered to

9. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in
Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988) (noting that the standard has constructed "a
highly artificial 'reasonable person,' who is much more assertive in encounters
with police officers than is the average citizen"); see also id. at 455 ("[L]ower
courts . . . are engaged in defining the parameters of an artificial reasonable
person that has little contact with reality."). I routinely ask my law students
whether they would feel free to decline a request such as the one made in
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431-32 (1991), and almost uniformly, they
indicate that they would not, notwithstanding my assumption that law students
are among the most educated and empowered of Americans.
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do so. Thus, police commands or orders create seizures.1 0
The quintessential command is the order to stop," though
many other orders-to take one's hands out of one's
pockets, to get out of or into a vehicle, or to go someplace
you do not otherwise plan to go-are interpreted by the
courts as creating seizures as well.
Requests, by contrast, do not create seizures. 12 This is
usually true regardless of what is requested, unless the
request is quite extreme. A request to accompany police to

10. For cases holding orders to stop to be seizures, see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Smith, 772 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Beauchesne, 868 A.2d
972 (N.H. 2005); State v. Crandall, 108 P.3d 16 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on
other grounds, 136 P.3d 30 (Or. 2006). For cases holding other orders to be
seizures, see, e.g., Castle v. State, 999 P.2d 169, 170 (Alaska 2000) (order to "get
back in the car and stay there" constituted a seizure); Ippolito v. State, 789 So.
2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (order to get out of car constituted a seizure);
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142 (Ky. 1999) (order to remove hands from
pockets a seizure); State v. Sparr, 688 N.W.2d 913, 918-19 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004)
(officer pointing at defendant and telling her "No," when she tried to leave the
area, effected a seizure); State v. Morales, 2005-NMCA-27, 107 P.3d 513, 517
(N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (order to keep hands on the wall effected a seizure); State
v. Sanchez, 2005-NMCA-81, 114 P.3d 1075, 1079 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (order
that defendant come out of a shed constituted a seizure); State v. Cook, 2004Ohio-4793, No. 20427, 2004 WL 2008776, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2004)
(order that defendant open her hand a seizure); State v. Smith, 2005-Ohio-2560,
No. 04AP-859, 2005 WL 1220742, at *22 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24, 2005) (order to
"come back here" constituted a seizure); State v. Ruiz, 101 P.3d 824 (Or. Ct.
App. 2004) (order to remove hands from pockets a seizure); Commonwealth v.
McClease, 750 A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (stating to individual in parked
car, "Police Officer. Stay in your vehicle," constituted a seizure).
11. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 776 N.E.2d 1039 (Table), No. 01-P-310, 2002
WL 31322649, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002) ('The defendant was seized
in the constitutional sense when Detective Dunn stated to him 'stop-we're
police officers-we want to talk to you.' A police officer's use of the word 'stop'
conveys to a reasonable person that compliance is not optional and that he or
she is not able to leave.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2005)
(asking individual sitting on a bench in the Amtrak station if he would "answer
a few questions" not a seizure); Chapman v. State, 780 So. 2d 1036, 1037-38
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (police statement "Come here for a minute, can I talk
to you?" initiated a consensual encounter); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 708
N.E.2d 669, 672 (Mass. 1999) (asking defendant his name and address, and
whether he had any money, did not create a seizure). But see State v. Egan, 739
A.2d 469, 473-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that officer approaching a
parked vehicle, displaying his badge, and asking the driver for his "driving
credentials" constituted a seizure; "his request following his assertion of police
authority was likely perceived (indeed most likely intended) to be a command...
and a refusal to comply or depart the scene was not likely to be tolerated").
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the precinct for investigatory questioning is not a seizure; a
reasonable person would not believe that such a request
constrained his freedom. 13 A request for identification, and
retaining that identification to run a warrant check, is often
not treated as a seizure, for reasonable people feel they can
decline such requests. 14 In the courts' view, the reasonable
person feels free to refuse anything that should properly be
understood as a request, regardless of the fact that it comes
from a police officer.' 5 The courts are impressed with

13. People v. Lawes, 790 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 2005) ("[D]efendant
was not seized when police detectives] approached him and requested that he
accompany them to the precinct for investigatory questioning. The detectives
were in plain clothes, no weapons were drawn, no force was used, and no
commands were given. A reasonable person under the circumstances would not
have believed that the conduct of the detectives or their request was a
significant limitation on his or her freedom.").
14. People v. Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 2005) (request for
identification and retaining it to run a warrant check not a seizure). There is
some disagreement about identification; asking to see identification is
ordinarily viewed as a consensual request, see, e.g., People v. Cartwright, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[Passenger in vehicle subjected to traffic
stop was not seized when the officer requested her identification, because] he
asked Cartwright if she had any identification. Because nothing in the content
or form of the question imparted any compulsion to comply, there is no basis for
'finding Cartwright was under the kind of restraint associated with a Fourth
Amendment detention .... [H]er decision to cooperate by producing some sort of
identification paper appears to have been wholly consensual."); cf. J.P. v. State,
855 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reasonable juvenile would
believe he was compelled to respond to officer's request for identification).
Courts disagree about whether keeping the identification to run a warrant
check turns that consensual request into a seizure. While most courts treat it as
consensual, some consider it a seizure. Compare People v. Cook, No. C047085,
2005 WL 567324, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2005) (warrant check does not
"automatically convert a consensual encounter into a detention."), People v.
Bennett, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 1998) (request that defendant wait in
the back of the police car while the officer checked for outstanding warrants
generated a consensual encounter), State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 83 (Iowa
2004) (no seizure occurs when officer asks for identification or retains it to
check for outstanding warrants), and McLellan v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d
699 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (request for identification and retaining it to run a
warrant check was consensual encounter), with State v. Page, 103 P.3d 454, 457
(Idaho 2004) ("[A] limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver's
license or other paperwork of value."), and Reynolds v. State, 746 A.2d 422 (Md.
Ct. App. 1999) (initial request for defendant's name was not a seizure, but
implicitly expecting him to wait while officers ran a warrant check on his
identification for five minutes turned the encounter into a seizure).
15. In fact, this is not even an accurate picture of many social interactions;
social norms make many "requests" in fact simply commands: "Will you step
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politeness and tend to view well-mannered behavior as
consistent with requests rather than commands, 16 even
though this disregards the fact that many "requests" are in
fact simply commands: "Will you step over here, please?"
may not really be a request that an individual in an
17
interaction with a police officer is free to refuse.
Conversely, ambiguous statements-construable as orders
or as requests-are more likely to be deemed orders if they
are rude or hostile' 8 or if they seek something highly
intrusive.19

this way, please?" or "Can you please hold?" are not really requests we are free
to refuse, even though as a matter of language they may be couched that way.
16. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, No. D036905, 2002 WL 27127 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 10, 2002). Robinson was sitting in a legally parked car. Two officers
approached the car, and one said to Robinson, "Would you mind stepping out of
the car?" Id. at *3.Robinson complied, and complied with a further request for
proof of identification. The information revealed an outstanding warrant on
Robinson; police then asked permission to search Robinson's car and found
cocaine. Robinson's motion to suppress was denied. Id. at *1."Krouss asked,
rather than commanded, Robinson to step out of and move to the back of the
car," and "Robinson willingly cooperated with Krouss's requests." Id. at *2.
There is a dissent that disparages the notion that this was a consensual
encounter. Id. at *3-4 (McDonald, J., dissenting). But see United States v.
Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that where officers
interrupted an individual in conversation, asked him to come and speak to the
officers, stood on either side of the individual, asked for his identification, and
took possession of it, the individual was seized). The district court was "swayed
by the fact that Engeldinger politely questioned Johnson rather than made
demands of him. The district court's focus on Engeldinger's tone and language
is misguided. We again reiterate that it is the totality of circumstances, not one
particular detail, that we consider when determining if a seizure occurred." Id.
at 1022.
17. Smith v. Florida, 753 So. 2d 713, 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(Altenbernd, Acting C.J., concurring) ("I realize that case law is beginning to
develop distinctions based upon an officer's rhetoric. . . . I am not entirely
convinced that a reasonable person stopped by an officer believes that he is free
to leave if the officer says, 'May I look in your mouth?' but has a different
understanding if the officer says, 'Open your mouth.' ... All people, including
police officers, communicate the level of their authority to control others both
verbally and non-verbally.") (citation omitted).
18. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2000)
(allegation that an officer said to plaintiff, "What, are you stupid? Come here. I
want to talk to you," coupled with a demand to show his hands, sufficiently
alleged a Fourth Amendment seizure).
19. See State v. Newton, 737 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (request
that defendant open his mouth so officer could search for drugs inside his
mouth was a seizure).
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Even on their own terms, these rules seem
questionable. The line between requests and orders can be
hard to discern. 20 Is "hey, come over here" a request or an
order? Would the addition of a word or two appreciably
change our understanding of the character of the phrase?
Even assuming the legitimacy of the test, some decisions
are plainly inconsistent with it.21 Moreover, conclusions
that turn on the specific language used in a street
encounter place significant importance on what are certain
20. See, e.g., In re D.T.B., 726 A.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("come here,"
stated twice in a "stern and commanding tone," resulted in a seizure when
defendant submitted); Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993) (request that
defendant get out of car was really a demand and effected a seizure when
defendant complied); People v. Dent, 797 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
("wait a minute," followed by approach of a number of officers as defendant
sought to enter a residence, constituted a seizure); Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d
564, 565 (Ind. 2001) (statement "hey come here" constituted a seizure); Jones v.
State, 572 A.2d 169, 170, 172 (Md. 1990) (statement by officer that was either
"Hey, could you come here," "Hold on a minute," or "Hey, wait a minute"
effected a seizure); State v. Quezada, 681 A.2d 79, 81 (N.H. 1996) (holding, over
dissent, that police call to defendant, '"Hey, you, stop"' followed by the
statement, "Hey, I want to speak to you," constituted a seizure because the
second statement, "in conjunction with the first . . . fairly indicated that
compliance was mandatory").
21. See, e.g., People v. Kennedy, No. F045610, 2005 WL 15193 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 4, 2005). In Kennedy, a deputy sheriff observed the defendant walking by
and thought he seemed "unusually interested" in the officer's presence. Id. at
*1. The deputy said to the defendant, "[w]hat are you doing tonight?" Id. at *2.
The defendant turned the right side of his body away from the deputy. He lifted
his right hand up and under the jacket to the area of his waistband and pocket.
The deputy said "[1]et me see your hands." Id. The defendant took his hand out
of his pocket, slid it down his leg, and dropped items on the ground, which
proved to be a magnetic key box containing methamphetamine. The defendant
claimed that the command to take his hands out of his pocket turned the
encounter into a seizure. The court disagreed: "Baldwin neither commanded
defendant to stop nor to approach. He merely told defendant to take his hand
back out of his pocket. No reasonable person in these circumstances would
think himself not free to leave." Id. at *3. One possible basis for the court's
misunderstanding here is the standard it applied-whether Reynolds felt "free
to leave." Id. The federal standard defining when a seizure occurs was originally
articulated as whether a reasonable individual in the defendant's situation
would have felt "free to leave," see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
545 (1980), but was revised in Bostick to the current standard: whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the request or terminate the
encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). In situations like this
one, the question for a person who has been told by an officer, "let me see your
hands," is not whether a reasonable person in this situation would be free to
leave, but whether he would feel free not to do what he has been told. Kennedy,
2005 WL 15193 at *3.

2007]

THE GAMESMANSHIP MODEL

1497

to be different recollections of the precise language and tone
of voice employed by officers. This in turn relies on
credibility determinations about whose version of events to
believe. 22 There are also some fuzzy areas, where the
ambiguity of the police message makes the answer unclear:
the repeated request, 23 conduct plus a request, 24 or requests
coupled with a show of force. 25 Symbolic conduct is parsed
22. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 118 A.2d 36, 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955)
("There is an extreme variation, if not a complete contradiction, between the
testimony of the two Newark police officers involved and that of defendant and
his four supporting witnesses.").
23. In some circumstances, a request, when repeated, is treated as an order
and results in a seizure. The issue seems to be whether the repetition of the
request conveys a message that ignoring the request was impermissible and
that compliance is in fact required. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barros, 755
N.E.2d 740, 742, 745 (Mass. 2001) (officer's first statement to defendant, "[h]ey
you . . .I want to speak with you," did not amount to a seizure, but when the
defendant ignored the request and the officer walked up to the defendant,
pointed at him and said, "[h]ey you. I wanna talk to you. Come here," that
amounted to a seizure; the officer "was communicating what a reasonable
person would understand as a command that would be enforced by the police
power"). But see United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2005) (fact that
officer knocked on window of vehicle three times "did not amount to a show of
authority such that a reasonable person would believe he was not at liberty to
ignore Sergeant Brother's presence and go about his business"; suspect ignored
the officer twice but rolled down the window the third time); United States v.
Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (fact that request to consent to
a search was made twice did not render the encounter nonconsensual) ("[T]he
officers did nothing to indicate to Torres-Guevara that she was required to
agree to be searched or to answer [the officer's] questions."); Edge v. State, 603
S.E.2d 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (officer "requested that Edge come to him" and
when Edge ignored him, said "hey" and again requested that he stop; court
concluded the encounter was consensual and noted: "That the officer called out
to Edge twice does not change our analysis").
24. Compare Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 153-54 (Colo. 2001) (officer
calling defendant over to the car, after pulling the police vehicle onto the
sidewalk and following five feet behind defendant for a distance of twenty or
thirty feet, constituted a show of authority and amounted to an investigatory
stop), and State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 26, 868 A.2d 188, 188 (Me. 2005)
(tapping on a car window and asking the driver to roll down the window
constituted a seizure), with Purce v. United States, 482 A.2d 772, 777 (D.C.
1984) (tapping on window and asking occupant to show identification was not a
seizure).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25, 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2005)
(officers asked a man whether he lived in the house where he was sitting, asked
why he was sitting there, emerged from their patrol car, physically boxed in the
individual, and asked for his identification; court held encounter was
consensual); Stith v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 2394-03-2, 2005 WL
41529, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005) (holding over a dissent that four armed
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with care. In the most subtle interpretation of expressive
police conduct, approaching a stopped vehicle with the blue
lights on is ordinarily deemed a seizure, while approaching
or flashlight creates a
it with a white searchlight
26
consensual encounter.
In many situations deemed consensual, most of us
would have profound doubts about whether the individual
in question voluntarily participated in the encounter.
Consider, for example, People v. Robinson.27 Mr. Robinson
was sitting in a legally parked car. Two officers approached
the car, and one said to Mr. Robinson, "Would you mind
stepping out of the car?"28 Mr. Robinson complied, and
complied with a further request for proof of identification.
The information revealed an outstanding warrant on Mr.
Robinson; police then asked permission to search Mr.
Robinson's car and found cocaine. Mr. Robinson's motion to
suppress was denied; the court concluded that the situation
was entirely consensual. The officer "asked, rather than
commanded, Robinson to step out of and move to the back
of the car," and "Robinson willingly cooperated with [the
officer's] requests. '29 The court viewed Mr. Robinson as
completely free to decline the officer's "request" for
identification. 30 Or, consider United States v. Laboy,31 in
officers standing in a semicircle three to four feet from an individual and
questioning him about criminal conduct was a consensual encounter).
26. For cases holding that turning on the blue lights constitutes a seizure,
see Stevens v. State, No. CACR 04-919, 2005 WL 1231713, at *2, *4 (Ark. Ct.
App. May 25, 2005); State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 570 (Kan. 2003) (activation of
emergency lights when officers pulled up behind parked vehicle constituted a
show of authority and rendered encounter a seizure); cf. United States v.
Mikulski, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206, 1210-11 (D. Utah 2001) (where police
drove up to a pickup truck without blocking it or using emergency lights, two
officers in plain clothes approached the truck, one on either side, identified
themselves as police officers, and showed their badges, and asked for
identification, the encounter was consensual), aff'd, 317 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.
2003).
27. No. D036905, 2002 WL 27127 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan, 10, 2002). Many of
these seizure decisions are unpublished. In California, this means litigants are
precluded from citing or relying on them. CAL. R. CT. 976, 977. While this might
suggest the cases are so factually specific that they lack precedential value, in
fact the same stylized fact situations recur frequently.
28. Robinson, 2002 WL 27127, at *1.
29. Id. at *2.
30. "Krouss did not order Robinson to surrender his identification card nor
did he use physical force, threats or coercion to obtain Robinson's card. Instead,
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which the court held that an officer's gesture to an
eighteen-year-old indicating that the officer wanted the
young man to come to him was not a seizure, because "a
reasonable person would have felt free not
to cross the
32
street and encounter" the beckoning officer.
As the reasonableness standard is applied in the
suppression context, it appears that individuals, in the view
of the courts, participate voluntarily in all kinds of
interactions that incriminate them, 33 and do so under
circumstances in which reasonable people would know that
they are not obliged to do so. A person carrying a cooler
containing twenty-six kilograms of cocaine felt no
compulsion to agree when law enforcement officials asked
to look inside his cooler, but simply participated in a
consensual encounter. 34 A man who agreed to be subjected
Robinson voluntarily gave his identification card to Krouss in response to
Krouss's request, which Robinson was free to decline." Id.
31. 979 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir. 1992) (officer gesturing to eighteen-year-old
man to come to him, while three other men were being placed under arrest, not
a seizure). Noted the dissent:
Given our society's propensity to obey the reasonable requests of police
officers, I believe common sense is ignored by holding the actions of the
police officer in signaling Mr. Laboy to cross the street and appear in
front of the officer were not inherently coercive. A nonverbal hand
signal ordering a person to cross a street and travel 100 feet to the
police officer's presence would not lead a reasonable person to believe
he or she was free to ignore the police officer's directives and questions.
Id. at 800 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
32. See also State v. Jones, 2002-Ohio-1109, No. 20810, 2002 WL 389055, at
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2002) (when officers approached a group and Jones
and another man walked away, officers "called from the window of the cruiser"
and "asked him to return to the group," which he did; Jones' rejoining of the
group was voluntary and resulted in a consensual encounter).
33. See, e.g., People v. Ellison, No. A098273, 2003 WL 21321834, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 10, 2003) (holding encounter consensual when officer asked
defendant what was going on, asked some other questions, and "asked Mr.
Ellison if he could put his hands behind his head so I could pat search him for
weapons and he did so"); State v. Poole, 730 So. 2d 340, 341-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (in response to question by officer whether defendant "had any
narcotics," defendant answered "yes," and pulled homemade crack pipe from her
pants; court concluded this was "purely consensual" encounter).
34. United States v. Perez, 198 F. Supp. 2d 406, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(individual who was followed into an elevator by three law enforcement agents,
who was asked by the agents if they could look into the large plastic cooler he
had with him, who gave consent, and who told the officers, when they asked,
that the bricks inside were narcotics-twenty-six kilograms of cocaine-
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to a patdown for weapons was simply participating in a
consensual encounter, even
though it revealed his
35
possession of crack cocaine.
On occasion, the courts go even further in the
gamesmanship direction. When a defendant claims that he
was required to comply with a police request, courts
sometimes shift the burden to the individual stopped to
affirmatively assert the desire to leave. Under this
approach, the right to decline must be asserted to
determine whether it will be honored. 36 Consistent with the
gamesmanship model, it is the defendant's failure to
indicate the desire to leave that resulted in the seizure of
evidence. In the absence of such a request, courts deem the
encounter consensual. 37

participated in consensual encounter) ("[P]olice did nothing more than ask
Perez one question in the lobby and one question inside the elevator in a casual
and relaxed manner.").
35. State v. Hardin, 2005-Ohio-130, No. Civ. A. 20305, 2005 WL 78702, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2005) (interaction in which officers asked Hardin his
name, asked for identification, asked if he had weapons, and asked to perform a
patdown for weapons which revealed crack cocaine was consensual encounter;
officer "merely asked Hardin some questions and requested some information
from him;" there was no "display of physical force or authority that would have
caused a reasonable person in Hardin's position to believe that he was not free
to decline [the officer's] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter").
36. See, e.g., People v. Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 795 (Ct. App. 1999)
("Her argument the officer would have stopped her had she tried to leave the
area is unavailing because it is based solely upon speculation. The burden is on
the individual to assert her right to terminate the encounter, and Cartwright
never asserted her right. If she had, and the officer then decided to stop her, the
Fourth Amendment would have been engaged. But she made no such
attempt.").
37. See, e.g., People v. Lippert, No. E034959, 2005 WL 1539584, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 30, 2005) ("[N]othing in the record shows that Detective Siebert
would have prevented defendant from simply asserting his preference not to
talk and walking away. Because Detective Mason had no information
connecting defendant with the crime, the officers had no basis to detain him. If
he told them that he did not wish to speak with them, the officers could not
have forced an interview. If so, that would have been an unlawful detention.");
People v. Cook, No. C047085, 2005 WL 567324, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. March 10,
2005) (holding that there was no seizure when the individual was approached
by a deputy who asked for his name, date of birth, and parole status and then
ran a records check) ("The record does not reflect how long the records check
took. There is no evidence, however, that defendant expressed a desire to leave
or otherwise terminate the encounter."); State v. Kwiatkowski, 519 S.E.2d 43,
45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (individuals who were parked and who gave their
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Such requests would not inevitably solve the problem,
however. Perversely, courts sometimes note a defendant's
decision to assert his right to refuse as proof of the fact that
he felt empowered to refuse, making the encounter one a
reasonable person could have refused and therefore making
it consensual. 3s Under this approach, a request to terminate
the encounter makes it consensual, while the absence of
such a request also reflects consent. This "heads I win, tails
you lose" environment invokes a tremendously expansive
and highly unrealistic view of individual autonomy and
empowerment in the traditional street encounter. It also
makes it possible to place the responsibility for the
encounter and its result squarely on the shoulders of the
defendant, who, regardless of the circumstances, could have
achieved a different outcome if only he had done the right
thing.
There is another gamesmanship component to the
consensual encounter standard. While the standard
presumes that a reasonable person knows when he is free to
decline an officer's requests, as a legal matter that freedom
turns, in part, on the officer's level of suspicion. If the
officer's observations do not amount to reasonable
suspicion, then the individual is free to decline the
encounter. On the other hand, if the officer has reasonable
suspicion, he has the authority to subject the individual to a
stop and to require compliance if the individual refuses. But
the individual, even assuming he understands the
governing legal principles, has no way of knowing how
much suspicion the officer has. Walking away may be
constitutionally protected, or it may be a criminal act; which
drivers' licenses to police were free to leave-"all they had to do was ask"); see
also Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Pointer, 991 F.2d 797 (Table), No. 92-1161,
1993 WL 101458 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 1993). Pointer was asked to go to the police
station for questioning and was told he was not under arrest. He claimed that
"no reasonable black man, when faced with police officers, would reject an
'invitation,' no matter how friendly, to go to a police station." Id. at *5. The
court disagreed, noting that
Pointer refused a police request to be fingerprinted and photographed,
after he had already accompanied the officers to the station and had
given an inculpatory statement. We note that he had no compunction
at that time, after he had been fully 'coerced,' in refusing the police. His
behavior belies his claim of intimidation.
Id. at *5-6.
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it is may prove to be a roll of the dice. 39 At least in some
circumstances, the suspect needs not only to be reasonable
40
about the legality of the officer's actions, but to be right.
One might argue that an individual knows perfectly
well whether he's guilty of anything, but that is both an
overinclusive and underinclusive inquiry. There can easily
be suspicion pointing to even an entirely innocent person, so
my certainty that I have done nothing wrong does not mean
that the officer does not have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to detain me. 4 1 The fact that I know that I
have a criminal act somewhere in my past does not tell me
whether the officer in question knows that, whether his
information is valid, and whether it amounts to the
requisite quantum of suspicion. The law, in effect, requires
the individual to test the officer's powers by declining to
comply with them. The failure to do so--and the consequent
result-is thus squarely the defendant's responsibility.
The gamesmanship model assumes that the choice to
decline a police request is unburdened, that no negative
consequences will accompany a failure to comply, and
therefore that individuals will readily assume the risk of
reaching an erroneous conclusion about their obligations to

39. See, e.g., State v. Ballough, 2002-Ohio-1006, No. 01-COA-1415, 2002 WL
358627 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2002). Ballough was standing in a Wendy's
parking lot at 12:45 a.m. looking north. An officer deemed this conduct to be
suspicious, and asked defendant for his identity and address. When defendant
refused to provide this information and "began to leave," he was arrested,
charged, and ultimately convicted for obstructing official business. Id. at *1.
The appellate court affirmed. Id. at *2. A dissent criticized the court's opinion,
arguing that because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, his
failure to comply with the request for identification-which he was not required
to produce-could not constitute a crime. Id. (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-02 (1997). The North Dakota offense of
"preventing arrest" makes it a crime to resist or to assist anyone else in
resisting an arrest for a misdemeanor. The statute provides: "It is a defense to a
prosecution under this section that the public servant was not acting lawfully,
but it is no defense that the defendant mistakenly believed that the public
servant was not acting lawfully." Id.
41. Imagine, for example, that an officer hears a report that a white woman
in her mid-forties was seen robbing a nearby bank, and that she left the bank,
wearing a business suit and tennis shoes, and carrying a black briefcase.
Imagine, further, that a woman meeting this precise description walks past the
officer at exactly the time one would expect her to do so if she were fleeing the
bank. There is surely reasonable suspicion to stop the woman and inquire, even
if she is a law professor on an after-work stroll rather than a fleeing felon.
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obey. Reasonable people are sometimes risk averse,
however, and there are several downside risks involved in
disregarding police directions. One is the concern that, by
refusing to comply with police direction, an individual
exposes himself to the risk of the use of force. 42 There are
certainly police brutality cases in which the triggering
43
incident was the victim's failure to obey police orders,
even though police had no reasonable suspicion and

42. In Commonwealth v. Hart, 695 N.E.2d 226 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998), the
trial court viewed this as relevant to the question of whether there was a
seizure, stating that "[h]istorically . . . blacks who have walked, run, or raced
away from inquisitive police officers have ended up beaten and battered and
sometimes dead," and that a "reasonable black American would not feel free to
leave when stopped and questioned by police." The appellate court reversed the
trial court's determination that there was a seizure when an officer, "at all
times courteous," initiated a contact by saying, "[e]xcuse me," and asked if he
could speak with defendant. Id. at 227, 229.
There is also an interesting legal problem with refusing to comply. If I
believe that I have been ordered to submit, but I do not, I have not been seized.
A seizure requires not only the order to submit, but submission or the use of
physical force, however slight, to control the suspect. So the only way for me to
test the legitimacy of the officer's order to submit is, in fact, to submit.
Submission, however, tends to add credence to a claim that the encounter was
consensual. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 3904, 2005 WL 947195 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 11, 2005). Officers on a Chicago Transit Authority train saw
Christopher Hicks, an African-American male, standing on a platform at a CTA
station, and thought that he was suspicious. They followed him onto a train and
observed him walking between cars, a violation of a CTA ordinance. When
officers confronted Hicks with his violation of the ordinance, he ran from the
train. Officers left the train at the next stop, pursued Hicks, and subdued him
using a choke hold. Hicks died as a result of the officers' prolonged efforts to
subdue him, although all conceded that there was no justification for the use of
deadly force to arrest Hicks. Id. at *3. See also Bennett v. City of Eastpointe,
410 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 2005). This case involved several allegations that
African-American youths riding bicycles in a Detroit suburb were stopped when
they crossed Eight Mile into Eastpointe. In one incident, four boys were riding
their bicycles when an officer "turned his car in front of the youths and blocked
their paths," and ordered the youths to get off their bikes and put their hands
on the car. Id. at 831. Three of the boys obeyed this direction but a fourth did
not, instead dismounting his bike and walking two blocks toward Eight Mile
Road. "As he was about to cross back into Detroit, another Eastpointe officer
pulled his patrol car in front of James, threw him against the car, handcuffed
him, and forcibly detained him in the patrol car." Id. The court concluded that
the stop was permissible because the way in which the boys were riding their
bikes (riding double, as police alleged, or riding four abreast, as plaintiffs
claimed) violated state law. Id.
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therefore no legal basis to compel compliance. 44 Other
negative consequences also potentially follow. 45 As Part II
of this Article argues, a failure to cooperate often carries
with it significant consequences: seizure, arrest, and charge
and conviction of a crime stemming from the failure to
cooperate.
D. The GamesmanshipModel and the Consensual
Encounter:Better Luck Next Time
The gamesmanship model leaves the courts with a
problem. While the outcomes often favor the government,
the courts are eager to demonstrate that such a result was
not a foregone conclusion, and that it would have been
possible for a defendant, acting differently, to avoid the
result. Accordingly, they sometimes creatively discuss ways
in which the individuals in question could have thwarted or

44. See, e.g., Steinbrecher v. Dickey, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1105 (N.D. Ill.
2001). Without any reasonable suspicion or particularized need, a police officer
approached plaintiff and asked for her identification; she said she did not have
it with her and was told that the officer "would have to take her into custody
and search her." Id. When plaintiff said she did not want to be searched and
attempted to walk away, "Officer Dickey grabbed her arm, twisted it behind her
back, pushed her by the neck to the squad car and ordered her to place her
hands on the hood." Id. The officers then searched plaintiffs backpack. "When
she asked what authority they had to stop and search her, Sergeant Radley
responded that it was department policy. The officers ultimately released her
and no charges were brought against her." Id. The police chief refused to
initiate a complaint against the officers at the request of the plaintiff, saying
that "everything that happened was in conformity with Oswego Police
Department policy." Id. at 1105-06; see also Newell v. City of Salina, 276 F.
Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Kan. 2003). An officer called "stop" and grabbed a female
pedestrian by the arm but did not identify himself, and the pedestrian pulled
away. Id. at 1151. The officer then "used an arm bar twist to force plaintiff to
the ground, then placed his knee or elbow into her back for a number of seconds,
as if to hold her down, and grabbed her left arm." Id. at 1152. Officers believed
the pedestrian was intoxicated. She was charged with public intoxication and
resisting arrest, and brought a civil suit after her acquittal on those charges.
The defendant argued that the case "presents the classic situation in which a
plaintiffs own actions in reaction to a legitimate law enforcement encounter...
justif[y] the subsequent actions of the law enforcement officers involved." Id. at
1154.
45. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, No. 00CM7134, 2002 WL 89006, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2002) (testimony of defendant on whether he was asked to
stop or told to stop, "I don't know his exact words he said, but if you keep
walking and stuff you get arrested for some reason or another").
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ignored, presumably with impunity, even the most
persistent police requests.
Consider, for example, United States v. EsparzaMendoza.46 Esparza-Mendoza was at a house when
someone threw a brick at his car. The officer called to the
house where the incident took place said she "needed" to
speak to the owner of the car to ask about the damage.
Responding to the officer's claim of "need," EsparzaMendoza came out of the house and was told by the officer
that she "needed to get some identification from him."47
Esparza-Mendoza replied that he did not want anything
done about the damage to the vehicle. She reiterated that
she "needed" to see his identification. Ultimately, he
produced identification, which provided evidence that he
was a deported felon. 48 Esparza-Mendoza claimed that the
repeated insistence that the officer "needed" to see his
identification constituted a demand for it, making the
encounter a seizure. The court disagreed. It then suggested
that Esparza-Mendoza had many lawful alternatives to
complying with police requests, and described them: he
could have stayed in the home notwithstanding the officer's
request that he come out; he could have simply refused to
provide identification; and he could have reentered the
house without doing what the officer asked of him. 49

46. 386 F.3d 953, 960 (10th Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 956.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 960. While "[a] reasonable person might indeed have felt
compelled by simple good manners, or by an understandable but nonetheless
unnecessary unease around law enforcement officers, to accede to Deputy Cook,
.. . a reasonable person should not have felt legally compelled to do so in these
circumstances." Id.; see also State v. Jennings, 99 P.3d 1145 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004). Police were executing a search warrant at a home when Mr. Jennings
and two companions knocked at the door of the home. The three men were
wearing large winter coats-it was late December. Police told the men to take
their hands out of their pockets and officers questioned each man. Jennings
consented to a search, which resulted in the seizure of rock cocaine from his
pocket. Jennings claimed that the search was impermissible because it was the
fruit of an unlawful seizure. The court disagreed, arguing that Jennings had not
been seized at all; notwithstanding the order to remove their hands from their
pockets, the officer "did not command the men to remain in place ... and would
not communicate to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave."
Id. at 1149. As noted supra note 21, the confusion regarding whether an
individual is free to leave or to refuse to comply is problematic. The court's

1506

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Is this really how courts, prosecutors and police believe
that interactions between individuals and police do or
should function? While the suppression cases make the
government a situational advocate for the view that
reasonable individuals can and should treat anything short
of a direct order from a police officer as an offer that can be
refused, this approach is a product of the gamesmanship
model. The best evidence of gamesmanship is the way that
the government treats the citizen's right to refuse in a very
different set of cases, involving violations of the legal duty to
comply with police officers.

II. EVIDENCE OF GAMESMANSHIP: CONSIDERING THE
OBLIGATION TO COMPLY

Part I demonstrated that in the context of motions to
suppress, the government argues that compliance with police
requests is in many circumstances entirely voluntarysomething which individuals are free to refuse. Any loss of
constitutional rights is the fault of the defendant, who failed
to assert his right to decline. The courts, in turn, seem to
find these arguments convincing; the right to refuse cases
envision an expansive and empowered universe of
individuals privileged to disregard and disobey the
directions of police officers. Any failure to assert that
privilege is the fault of the individuals involved, not the
police. As we have seen, in the absence of a direct order,
many courts consider that individuals, notwithstanding
their own internal compulsion to obey or the fear of
consequences for failure to comply, are free to disregard
police requests.
There are, however, circumstances in which the
government views the relationship between the police and
the citizen differently. In some cases, it seeks to convict an
individual for violating one of a myriad of statutes that
punish failure to comply with the orders of a police officer.

analysis means that Jennings would have been free, notwithstanding the
officer's direction, to ignore it and to walk away from the police.
The court in Esparza-Mendoza may have felt that its decision was the lesser
of two evils. The district court there held that there was a Fourth Amendment
seizure, but that aliens lacked the right to assert Fourth Amendment claims. By
deciding that there had been no Fourth Amendment event in the case, the court
of appeals avoided having to address the district court's extraordinary holding.
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A. NoncooperationStatutes
A large range of statutes could arguably be understood
as criminalizing an individual's failure to comply with a
police officer's direction. If such a failure could be
criminalized in all circumstances, the constitutional
privilege to decline a police request would be illusory. Police
could simply direct conduct they had no power to require,
and then arrest any individual who failed to comply. Most
courts appear to recognize this problem and ordinarily
refuse to permit criminalization of a refusal to comply with
police direction unless the officer was constitutionally able
to require compliance. But the fact that these cases need to
reach the appellate courts to be resolved correctly suggests
that the possibility of prosecution is a significant threat,
one that should-but has not yet-played a role in
assessing whether reasonable people routinely conclude
that they are entitled to decline to follow police direction.
There are numerous categories of noncooperation
statutes. Perhaps the most visible are the so-called stop and
identify statutes, 50 most recently addressed by the U.S.
50. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 84.710 (1989) (police in Kansas City "have the
power to stop any person abroad whenever there is reasonable ground to
suspect that he is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and
demand of him his name, address, business abroad, and whither he is going");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003) ("A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."); 24 VT. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 24, § 1983 (2005) ("A law enforcement officer is authorized to detain a
person if: (1) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has
violated a municipal ordinance; and (2) the person refuses to identify himself or
herself satisfactorily to the officer when requested by the officer."); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 968.24 (West 1998) ("A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a
public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects
that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime,
and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the
person's conduct."); see also ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT ANN. §
16-3-103 (West 2006); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-2402 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2006).
Some of these statutes remain questionable after Hiibel. See, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-7-1 (2002), which provides:
A peace officer may detain any person abroad about whom he or she
has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a crime, and may demand of the person his or her name,
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Supreme Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of
Nevada.51 Hiibel held that a stop and identify requirement is
constitutional if limited to circumstances in which police
have reasonable suspicion. 52 This principle is currently being
tested in the context of claims that antiterrorism measures
require individuals to identify themselves at police request
regardless of
whether there is any evidence of individual
wrongdoing. 53

address, business abroad, and destination; and any person who fails to
identify himself or herself and explain his or her actions to the
satisfaction of the peace officer may be further detained and further
questioned.
The purely subjective requirement that the explanation be to the officer's
satisfaction seems of dubious constitutionality.
51. 542 U.S. 177 (2004). In Hiibel, police went to the scene of a reported
assault and saw a man talking to a woman in a truck. The man appeared to be
intoxicated. The officer asked him for identification, and the man refused to
provide it. Ultimately, he was arrested for failure to provide identification and
was charged with "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office." Id.
at 180-81. The legal duty was imposed by NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.123, which
provided that a peace officer may detain a person "under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to
commit a crime," in order to "ascertain his identity and the suspicious
circumstances surrounding his presence abroad," and provides that "[a]ny
person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer
any other inquiry of any peace officer." Hiibel was convicted of violating the
obstruction statute. The Court held that the state could punish a refusal to
disclose identity, pursuant to a state statute, when a person was subjected to a
reasonable suspicion stop. In the Court's view, the criminal sanction was
necessary to compel individuals to provide their names when asked for them
during a Terry stop. "The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the
request for identity does not become a legal nullity." Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188.
One author has suggested that the war on terror and the perceived need to
identify potentially suspicious persons motivated Hiibel. See Jamie L. Stulin,
Did Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the
Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's Decision to Compel
Identification,54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1452-53, 1478-83 (2005).
52. State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984), expresses the
converse: that there is no right to demand identification where there is no
reasonable suspicion. Police arrived at a private club to execute a search
warrant. They asked defendant's name, saying it was "needed" for the
investigation. When defendant refused to provide his name, he was arrested
and charged with "interference with official acts." Id. at 338. The court of
appeals overturned the conviction, holding that as defendant was not seized, he
was free to disregard the officer's request. Id. at 340-41.
53. Such a situation created a cause c~l~bre in Colorado, when Deborah
Davis, a woman riding on a bus through a federal compound, refused to show
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Stop and identify statutes are only one of a wide range of
criminal statutes which punish varying degrees of refusal to
cooperate with police officers. Statutes define offenses such
as obstruction of an officer, 54 obstruction of governmental
57
administration, 55 failure to obey, 56 disorderly conduct,

identification to guards who requested it while she was on the bus. See Karen
Abbott, Refusal to PresentID Sparks Test of Rights; Arvada Woman Said "No'at
Federal Center While on Public Bus, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 29, 2005, at
5A. Ms. Davis was not getting off the bus at the Federal Center but was simply
riding through the area. She was removed from the bus, handcuffed and
ticketed, but ultimately the federal prosecutor dismissed the charges. See Karen
Abbott, Doors Close on Bus Case: Technicality Frees Arvada Woman Who
Refused to Show ID, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 8, 2005, at 5A. Officials cited
a technicality involving signage in dismissing the charges. Id. But similar
situations are certain to recur.
54. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24(a) (2003) ("[A] person who knowingly
and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful
discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor."); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/31-1 (West 2003) ("A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the
performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer . . . of any

authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), 2(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) ('Whoever
intentionally ... obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the
officer is engaged in the performance of official duties" is subject "to
imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more
than $1,000, or both."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.31 (a) (LexisNexis 2006)
("No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or
delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the
public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a
public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties."); W. VA.
CODE ANN § 61-5-17(a) (LexisNexis 2005) ("Any person who threats, menaces,
acts or otherwise, forcibly or illegally hinders or obstructs, or attempts to hinder
or obstruct, any law-enforcement officer ...acting in his or her official capacity is
guilty of a misdemeanor."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.41 (West 2005) ("Whoever
knowingly resists or obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in an
official capacity and with lawful authority, is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.").
55. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05 (McKinney 1999) ("A person is guilty
of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs,
impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means
of any independently unlawful act."); MIDDLETOWN, OHIO CITY ORDINANCES §
606.14 (2006) ("No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent,
obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within
the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a
public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties. Whoever
violates this section is guilty of obstructing official business.").
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interference with an officer, 58 and resisting. 59 Such
statutes-take as an example Georgia, which prohibits "[a]
person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any
law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official
duties" 6 0-suggest that citizens are required, on pain of

56. "Any person who knowingly fails or refuses to obey any lawful order of
any peace officer who is controlling or directing traffic shall be guilty of a traffic
infraction." NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,110(1) (2004).

57. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-1(a) (West 2005) ("A person commits an
offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law
or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public
servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight,
intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of
any independently unlawful act.").
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-167a (West 2001 & Supp. 2006)
("A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs,
resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer . . . or firefighter in the
performance of such peace officer's ...

or firefighter's duties."); IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 719.1 (West 2003) ("A person who knowingly resists or obstructs anyone
known by the person to be a peace officer . . . in the performance of any act
which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer . . .
commits a simple misdemeanor.").
59. See, e.g., ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE §8.30.010(A)(4) (2006) ("resisting or
interfering with a peace officer when . . . [t]he person intentionally, recklessly,
or knowingly delays or obstructs a police officer's active investigation of a crime
by fleeing after having been told to stop."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) (West
2006) ("Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public
officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician.., in the discharge or
attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment . . . shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment."); FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (2002) ("Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or
oppose any officer ...in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering
or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of
the first degree."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-705 (2004) ("Every person who willfully
resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to
discharge, of any duty of his office ... is punishable by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000) and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one
(1) year."); IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2004) ("A person who knowingly or
intentionally . . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by
visible or audible means . . . identified himself and ordered the person to stop;
commits resisting law enforcement."); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.479(1)(a) (2004)
("Any person shall not knowingly and willfully . . . [a]ssault, batter, wound,
obstruct or endanger ...duly authorized person[s] serving or attempting to serve
or execute any process, rule, or order made or issued by lawful authority or
otherwise acting in the performance of his or her duties.").
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (2003).
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criminal sanction, to comply and cooperate with law
enforcement.
If one took these statutes literally, one might conclude
Fourteenth
that, notwithstanding
the Fourth and
Amendments, states may freely criminalize the failure to
comply with police requests. Consider, for example, a
municipal ordinance that provides that "fleeing after having
been told to stop" constitutes an offense. 61 If this statute
criminalized all failures to stop in response to police
direction, regardless of whether the officer in question had
any basis for issuing the order to stop, then the right to
refuse would have no force; the state or municipality in
question could simply criminalize assertion of the right. The
courts, for the most part, recognize this concern and, using a
number of theories, constrain the potentially broad scope of
the obligation to comply statutes. 62 Some implicitly read into
the statutes a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment limitation
on their application. 63 An ordinance that penalizes the

61. ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE § 8.30.010(A)(4) (2006), which forbids a person
from fleeing after a police officer has told the person to stop, is discussed in
Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
62. There are some exceptions. See, e.g., H.A.P. v. State, 834 So. 2d 237, 240
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a delinquency adjudication for resisting an
officer without violence when a juvenile refused to leave the front of his
apartment building when asked to do so by police; the dissenting judge wrote,
"[ulntil today I had thought that one could ignore the unlawful order of a police
officer without incurring criminal liability.") (Joregenson, J., dissenting); State
v. Ballough, 2002-Ohio-1006, No. 01-COA-01415, 2002 WL 358627 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2002) (upholding conviction of individual who refused to provide
identification to a police officer, although there was no reasonable suspicion to
stop him). In some cases, it is unclear whether the issue was properly presented
to the courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 507 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). A
driver was stopped at a "routine roadblock" and asked for his license and
insurance. When he refused to produce it, he was arrested and ultimately
convicted of obstruction of an officer. Id. at 14. Since it was not clear that there
was a constitutional basis to conduct the road block, it appears that there was
no lawful basis to demand the license and no basis to convict Johnson of his
failure to comply; however, it does not appear that Johnson ever made that
argument. See also City of Fargo v. Roberson, 2001 ND 204, 636 N.W.2d 926
(N.D. 2001) (defendant convicted of unlawfully resisting an officer claimed that
because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop him, he could not be
convicted of resisting arrest; court held that he had not adequately preserved
the issue at trial).
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 334 S.E.2d 536, 541 (Va. Ct. App.
1985) (upholding Arlington County Code § 17-13, which provided that "[i]t
shall
be unlawful for any person at a public place . . .to refuse to identify himself by
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refusal to stop on the order of a police officer could be
interpreted to require that police have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to conduct a stop-or believe in good
faith that they do 64-before the statute can criminalize the
failure to comply. 65 An analogous issue has arisen in the
name and address at the request of a uniformed police officer . . . if the
surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the
public safety requires such identification," by interpreting the section "to permit
a detention only upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon
objective facts").
64. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 618 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). Turner
passed a traffic stop on the road, rolled down his window and yelled, "you
bastards." Id. at 608. The officer pursued Turner, believing him to be guilty of
disorderly conduct. The officer then pulled Turner's vehicle over. While writing
the citation, Turner disobeyed the officer's command to stay inside his vehicle
and was charged with obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Id. Turner
argued that the obstruction conviction could not stand because the stop of his
vehicle had been unlawful since his "rude and disrespectful comments" were not
a violation of the disorderly conduct statute. The court concluded that Turner
had not, in fact, violated the disorderly conduct statute but that, since the
officer had a good faith belief that he had, the stop of Turner's vehicle was
lawful. Id. at 608-09.
65. See, e.g., Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199, 203 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2002) ("AMC § 8.30.010(A)(4) forbids a person from fleeing after a
police officer has told the person to stop. Such a command to stop would not
violate the person's Fourth Amendment rights if the police officer already had
the authority to seize the person ....But the ordinance would raise significant
Fourth Amendment concerns if ... the ordinance applied to situations where
the police have no objective justification for seizing the person."); H.H. v. State,
775 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (offense of "resisting an officer
without violence" may be applied to someone who flees an officer if the
individual knows the officer intends to detain him, and the officer is justified in
making a stop). In H.H. v. State, the defendant was riding a bicycle; an officer
thought the bicycle was stolen and stopped the defendant. The court concluded
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop; accordingly, the stop
was not legal and the defendant could not be found to have resisted or
obstructed the officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty. Id. In S.G.K v.
State, 657 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), a juvenile ran from the scene
of a traffic accident, fearing that he would be caught skipping school. An officer
chased and apprehended him and he was convicted of "resisting arrest without
violence." Id. at 1247. The court overturned the conviction. Because the officer
"lacked an articulable well-founded suspicion of criminal activity" on the part of
the juvenile, he had no justification for attempting to detain him. Id. at 124748. Accordingly, he was constitutionally entitled to flee; the flight could not,
therefore, create a basis on which to charge him with a crime. The court noted
that the situation might have been different had the juvenile been ordered to
stop, but the mere fact that he might have known that the officer wanted to
question him about the accident was not enough to sustain his conviction. Id. at
1248. It seems likely that the reason the officer did not order the juvenile to
stop was that he knew he lacked the authority to do so; without the reasonable
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on home
context of the Fourth Amendment constraints
66
entry, and has been resolved comparably.
Courts also look beyond the Fourth Amendment to a
range of alternative means to limit the potentially
impermissible scope of these statutes. Some view this as a
problem of police discretion and vagueness, imposing
constraints on the broad application of these statutes as a
matter of due process, 67 and in some cases viewing the
suspicion necessary to justify a stop, he did not have a constitutional basis to
order the juvenile to halt. By contrast, flight from an officer was held to
constitute obstruction of an officer where the individual was ordered to stop and
submit to arrest, but instead fled the officer. Mangum v. State, 492 S.E.2d 300
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998); cf. Wester v. State, 480 S.E.2d 921, 923 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that flight after police officers identified themselves to defendant
sufficed to support a conviction of obstruction of an officer; "the jury was
authorized to infer that [defendant] knew that a police officer was attempting to
perform his official duty . . .and to find that [he] deliberately took action to
delay, hamper or impede the officer in the performance of his duty") (quoting
Sanders v. State, 419 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).
66. If police come to your home and demand entry, but there is no lawful
basis for an entry without consent, can the refusal to consent constitute a
crime? For the most part, the courts have held that it cannot, using evidence of
an individual's assertion of rights under the Fourth Amendment to prove a
criminal offense would be problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Prescott, 581
F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978). Police were looking for Prescott's neighbor; they
had probable cause to believe the neighbor was in Prescott's house, but did not
have a warrant. Police asked Prescott repeatedly to permit them to enter to
search for the neighbor, but Prescott refused. Ultimately, the officers kicked in
the door, located the neighbor, and charged Prescott as an accessory after the
fact. Id. at 1346-48. Prescott argued that the evidence that she refused consent
to the police entry should not be admissible because it was constitutionally
privileged. The court agreed, concluding that "her passive refusal to consent to a
warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as
evidence of criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 1351; see also People v. Hilgenberg, 585
N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). There, the defendants were in a home when a
sheriff arrived to investigate a complaint of underage drinking and disorderly
conduct. They refused to open the door for the sheriff, and were charged with
the offense of obstructing a peace officer. The court concluded that the charging
instruments were properly dismissed. The sheriff had no warrant and no basis
was alleged to justify a warrantless entry of the home; accordingly, the
prosecution charged it was a crime to assert the constitutionally-protected
privilege to decline to consent to a search of the home. See also City of Parma v.
Campbell, Nos. 79041, 79042, 2001 WL 1352657 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2001);
City of Middleburg Heights v. Theiss, 28-Ohio-B-9, 501 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985); Brown v. City of Oklahoma, 721 P.2d 1346 (Okla. Civ. App. 1986).
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stahl, No. 32 of 1988, 1989 WL 229385 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Aug. 11, 1989). Stahl challenged the constitutionality of 34 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 904, which provided that "it is unlawful for any person to
resist or interfere in any manner or to any degree or to refuse to produce
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absence of such constraints as justification for striking down
68
the statute.
Some statutes make clear that they are not intended to
apply to simple failures to comply. 69 Courts may narrow
identification" upon request of an officer performing any duty under the
Pennsylvania Game Code. Stahl, 1989 WL 229385, at *2. Stahl refused to
identify himself to a game commission officer and was cited and subjected to an
$800 fine. The court held that the statute was facially invalid: "Imposing
criminal sanctions on an individual who does nothing more than decline to state
his name to an officer of the law and who is not the subject of any investigation
is a patent violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment ....

."

Id.

at *7. The court did not consider there to be any Fourth Amendment issues in
the case because in its view the defendant was never seized. See also State v.
White, 640 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Wash. 1982) (overturning statute making it a
misdemeanor to "obstruct a public servant" because what constitutes a violation
is "left to the unfettered discretion of not only police officers, but virtually any
public servant"). But see American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, 63
P.3d 675 (Utah 2002) (upholding conviction of defendant for "interfering with a
peace officer seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention" even though the
conduct that constituted "interference" was the defendant telling gang members
who were being unlawfully detained that they did not need to cooperate with
the officers; court held that the legality of the detention was irrelevant;
dissenting chief justice argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad).
68. See, e.g., People v. Flinn, 497 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Erie County Ct. 1986). A
Buffalo ordinance provided that "[n]o person shall refuse to obey a reasonable
order or request of a police officer in the discharge of his regular duty." Id. at
995. A failure to comply with the section constituted disorderly conduct. The
court held that the ordinance criminalized the refusal to comply with orders
even if the police had no lawful authority to issue the orders.
The ordinance thus allows the police to make the law as well as to
enforce it. In so doing it permits the arrest and prosecution of
individuals engaged in lawful activity which conflicts with objectively
reasonable police requests. It may, for example, allow for an officer to
order an individual standing on a street corner to move on. Although it
is established that loitering, without more, is not illegal, a failure to
comply with the order could result in the individual's immediate
incarceration despite the legality of his presence on the street.
Id. at 995-96. The "conflict between reasonable police requests and the free
exercise of constitutional rights" required the striking down of the ordinance.
Id. at 996.
69. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-1 (West 2005) ("A person commits an
offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law
or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public
servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight,
intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of
any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to failure to
perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding
compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental
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others as a matter of statutory interpretation. If the statute
precludes obstruction of an officer, the courts typically
conclude that the obstruction statute is violated only where
the officer's conduct is lawfully part of his duty;70 obstructing
unlawful conduct by an officer-like an illegal stop-does not
violate the obstruction statutes. 7 1 Some statutes require that
the act of the defendant be "without privilege," and interpret
72
constitutionally permitted conduct as privileged conduct.

functions."), quoted in State v. Perlstein, 502 A.2d 81, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985). Most do not, however, relying on the courts to read these
requirements into the statutes.
70. For example, in Georgia, the offense of unlawful obstruction of an officer,
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24(a) (2003), requires that the obstructed officer be in
the "lawful discharge of his official duties." Overand v. State, 523 S.E.2d 610,
611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). If police lack articulable suspicion justifying a stop,
"their detention and questioning of a witness or suspect do not constitute
official duties and, though obstructed, are insufficient for an obstruction
conviction." Id. at 612. This principle does not always appear to be followed; in
Bean v. State, 418 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), for example, police observed
Bean getting into a car. A nearby driver yelled "[t]here's the police," and Bean
began to run, throwing away contraband as he went. Id. at 799. The court
deemed his flight and attempt to hide evidence were sufficient to constitute
obstruction, even though it is not clear on the facts that police had reasonable
suspicion to stop him. Id.
71. See, e.g., State v. Wiedenheft, 27 P.3d 873 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The
statute there, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-705 (2000), provided criminal sanction for
"[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, in
the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office .... ." The court
noted that "duty" in this statute applied only to 'lawful and authorized acts of a
public officer,"' and therefore that an individual's obstruction of 'an act of a
public officer which is contrary to the law"' does not violate § 18-705.
Wiedenheft, 27 P.3d at 875 (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 755 P.2d 471, 477
(Idaho Ct. App. 1988)); see also Overand, 523 S.E.2d at 611-12 ("Misdemeanor
obstruction of an officer in Georgia requires that] "the obstructed officer be in the
lawful discharge of his official duties," and that "refusal to remain at an alleged
crime scene pending a brief official police investigation constitutes unlawful
obstruction. But if police lack an articulable suspicion, their detention and
questioning of a witness or suspect do not constitute official duties and, though
obstructed, are insufficient for an obstruction conviction."); State v. Mendez, 970
P.2d 722 (Wash. 1999) (applying the state constitution, court ruled that WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.76.020(1) (West 2000), which penalizes "obstructing a public
servant," could not be applied to flight of a passenger from the scene of a traffic
stop, where no reasonable suspicion existed justifying a stop of the passenger).
72. For example, see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.31 (LexisNexis 2006),

which requires that a defendant perform an act, without privilege, with purpose
to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any
authorized act within the public official's official capacity that in fact hampers
or impedes the performance of the public official's duties; see also In re Payne,
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Resisting statutes are typically interpreted to require some
act of physical resistance; a failure to comply with an officer's
direction is not ordinarily sufficient.7 3 Flight is interpreted
not to constitute resistance unless the officer had the legal
right to detain the individual and the individual knew the
officer intended to detain him.7 4 Courts typically interpret
these statutes so that simple refusals to comply with police
requests do not violate them. 75
Most appellate courts, accordingly, recognize that an
individual's failure to cooperate with police can be
criminalized only where cooperation could constitutionally be
compelled. They recognize the potential that penalizing the
failure to comply with an officer's request imposes on other
individual rights. 76 Without such a principle, states could
2002-Ohio-4849, No. C-040705, 2005 WL 2248870 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16,
2005).
73. See, e.g., People v. Stoudt, 555 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990)
(complaint alleging that "defendant did knowingly refused [sic] to remove
himself from the 400 block of Lincoln Highway, De Kalb . . . after being
instructed to do so by Sgt. Berke of De Kalb City Police," did not sufficiently
allege the crime of resisting a police officer); see also City of Middletown v.
Hollon, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807 N.E.2d 945, 949-50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (offense of
obstructing official business requires affirmative act; defendant's refusal to
provide requested identification was not an act that obstructed the officer).
74. See J.P. v. State, 855 So. 2d 1262, 1265-66 (Fla. Dist. App. 2003)
(adjudication of delinquency of juvenile reversed; juvenile was charged with
resisting police officer without violence for fleeing from officer; officer had no
reasonable suspicion juvenile was involved in criminal activity).
75. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Michel, 378 N.E.2d 1077, 1078 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1978) (refusal to answer officer's knock at the door was an omission and
therefore could not violate an obstruction statute, which required that the
person "do any act which hampers or impedes a public official in the
performance of his lawful duty"). Noted one court, "noncompliance by a suspect
is not always a criminal offense." State v. Carroll, 2005-Ohio-4048, 834 N.E.2d
843, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Gillenwater, No. 97 CA 0935,
1998 WL 150354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (refusal to comply with Terry frisk not a
separate criminal offense of obstructing official business).
76. See, e.g., People v. Ailey, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 981 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974). Alley
was standing on the street distributing leaflets. A police officer approached him
and asked for identification; when he provided it, the officer told him that he
"had a duty to ascertain what he was distributing and who was distributing and
if he didn't allow me to do so, I would place him under arrest." Id. at 984.
Defendant refused to surrender the literature and was charged with "resisting
an officer in discharge of duty" under a Buffalo City Ordinance, which provided
that "[any person who shall refuse to obey, or shall resist any officer or
employee of the city in the discharge of his regular duty shall be subject to a
fine." Id. at 986. The court granted a motion to set aside the jury verdict
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use the threat of prosecutions for failure to comply with the
requests of officers as a vehicle for conducting otherwise
77
unlawful stops, searches, and arrests.
While appellate courts, for the most part, are clear that
the obligation to comply statutes cannot negate the right to
refuse, police and prosecutors are not. When individuals
refuse to comply with police requests, police may react by
compelling compliance, 78 and the failure to comply may
convicting the defendant, concluding that "[t]o require more information or
more co-operation under any circumstances could well violate defendants'
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights or in effect compel the
defendants to waive their rights thereunder by being required to obey the
request made by the police." Id. at 986.
77. See id. at 987. The court first construed the statute to require an officer
to have the constitutional authority to make a demand before refusal to comply
with the demand could constitute a crime:
where a police officer has no power or right to demand something, then
he has no authorized duty to perform in that regard and ... any order
given is unauthorized where no power or right exists. Thus the arrest
for refusing to obey the officer would be unauthorized.
Id. at 988. The court went on to note the danger if such prosecutions were
permitted:
If the demand of the arresting officer and the invocation of the city
ordinance provision were ruled proper under these circumstances, then
some unusual consequences and applications could be had. A police
officer could, for example, after merely seeing a pack of cigarettes in
someone's shirt pocket, demand that a citizen surrender it to determine
if perchance it contained marihuana; a police officer seeing someone
carrying luggage in a bus terminal could request him to open it to
determine if it contained contraband; seeing two people laughing while
reading a newspaper, a police officer could demand inspection to
determine if the paper exposed any group or individual to ridicule. For
failure to obey such demands for satisfaction of unbridled curiosity, a
citizen could subject himself to a fine and imprisonment unless he was
willing to waive a number of constitutional rights.

Id.
78. See, e.g., State v. Maland, 103 P.3d 430 (Idaho 2004). Two officers went
to a house to investigate a noise complaint. When they arrived, there was music
playing, but it was not excessively loud. The officers knocked and Maland
answered. Id. at 431. They asked him for identification and he said he did not
have any. Id. at 432. The officers suspected he was not telling the truth and
when Maland tried to end the encounter by shutting the door, the officer
blocked the door with her foot and pushed against it. The individual relented,
opened the door and revealed his true identity, and the officers learned there
was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. He was charged with obstructing an
officer. Id. The state supreme court ultimately ruled the entry unlawful and
overturned the resulting conviction. Id. at 437.
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then be prosecuted as a crime. Courts repeatedly address
situations in which individuals have been arrested and
subjected to criminal charges for nothing more than the
failure to do what police wanted them to do. 79 Police do not
like the failure to comply or cooperate with their directions,
and they treat it as-and often it is charged as-a crime.80
These issues arise both in the context of criminal

79. One court expressed some frustration on this score. See State v.
Christman, 2002-Ohio-2915, No. 19039, 2002 WL 1332034, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 14, 2002) (individual was charged with obstructing official business and
resisting arrest for hiding from police and failing to respond to their requests
and was convicted; court of appeals stated "[t]he facts reveal absolutely no basis
for the charge of obstructing official business. In fact, we wonder why the State
even charged the defendant, much less prosecuted him").
80. See, e.g., J.G.D. v. State, 724 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(overturning adjudication of delinquency when defendant was arrested for
failure to obey officer's command to leave an area; police had no articulable
suspicion of defendant and no basis to order him to leave); State v. Wilson,
35,963-KA (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/14/02); 822 So. 2d 20 (reversing conviction for
resisting an officer; defendant was arrested for refusing entry to her home to a
marshal, but court held that entry was not authorized by law); People v.
Ferreira, 807 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2005) (granting motion to
dismiss indictment charging defendant with obstruction of governmental
administration for refusing to follow a police direction to stay so that defendant
could be questioned because defendant was a witness to a shooting. Where
there was no suspicion that the defendant had been involved in a criminal act,
he had "no obligation to remain and answer the officer's questions," and "it
follows that his failure to comply with the officer's directive not to leave can
furnish no alternative basis for arrest"); State v. Redd, 2004-Ohio-4689, No.
20284, 2004 WL 1949476 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2004) (overturning defendant's
conviction for failure to comply with police officer's lawful order; defendant was
a passerby who noticed that an officer was arresting an acquaintance and
stopped to observe the arrest; the officer ordered defendant to leave the scene
and he refused, but did not obstruct traffic or interfere with the arrest); State v.
Ballough, 2002-Ohio-1006, No. 01-COA-01415, 2002 WL 358627 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 22, 2002) (officer observed defendant standing in a Wendy's parking lot
"staring" at 12:45 a.m., asked what he was doing, and asked him for his identity
and address; when defendant refused to comply with the request for
identification "and began to leave," he was arrested, charged, and convicted of
"obstructing official business"); see also Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 339
F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff was arrested for refusing to consent to
the search of his backpack while at a counterdemonstration against an Aryan
Nation parade; the backpack looked heavy and appeared to have two cylinders
in it, plaintiff refused to identify himself, and was "defiant" in his loud refusal
to consent to search, stating loudly that what the police were doing was "a
violation of [his] civil rights." Police told plaintiff that he would be arrested for
obstructing an officer if he did not permit a search; he responded that it was his
Fourth Amendment right not to be searched. The search of the backpack, at the
scene, revealed only food and clothing; plaintiff was arrested nonetheless).
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prosecutions and § 1983 suits, 8 ' where the individual in
question challenges the legitimacy of the police action.
The obligation to comply statutes are often invoked
against defendants whose conduct is unusually obstreperous
or annoying.8 2 People who test the police may find

81. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2003). Wilson lived
next door to Woolever, who arrived home intoxicated one evening and was being
arrested. Id. at 395. Wilson, an attorney, came outside to see what was
happening. Kittoe, the arresting officer, told Wilson to "get out of here" but
Wilson did not. Wilson asked Woolever if he wanted Wilson to represent him
and Woolever said yes. Wilson then asked Kittoe if he could speak with his
client for a moment when the arrest process was complete. Id. Wilson remained
calm and did not physically approach the arrest area, but Kittoe again told him
to leave. Id. at 396. Ultimately Kittoe arrested Wilson. Id. He claimed that
Wilson's "verbal criticism" and his offering of legal services to Woolever, as well
as his refusal to leave the area when directed to do so by Kittoe, provided
probable cause to justify his arrest for unlawful obstruction. Wilson was
charged with this offense, and the charge was ultimately nolle prosequi. The
court held that Kittoe lacked probable cause to arrest Wilson for obstruction,
and that he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 399; see also Marrs v.
Tuckey, 362 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932 (E.D. Mich. 2005). Marrs was a passenger in a
vehicle driven by her boyfriend. Id. at 931. Tuckey stopped the vehicle when the
driver failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign, and when the officer
approached the vehicle he found that Marrs was not wearing her seat belt. Id.
He asked for her identification, which she refused to provide. After telling her
"[i]f you don't tell me who you are right now, I'm going to place you under
arrest," id. at 932, Marrs was arrested and charged with resisting and
obstructing a police officer. A state court dismissed those charges several
months later on the ground that the statute prohibited only actual or
threatened physical interference with a police officer. Id. at 941.
82. The perfect example of this is McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Kan. 2003). McCormick got into a series of altercations with
local police in which he was loudly and sometimes profanely critical of them,
goaded them into anger, and persistently engaged in video and audio taping of
the officers. For example, McCormick called an officer a "cognitively impotent
pig," and videotaped an officer's threat to take McCormick to jail. Id. at 117879. Also, McCormick "flipped the bird" at an officer, called him a "sick pig," and
told him "you'd better get your pig ass out of here before you get in more
trouble." Id. at 1179-80. The officer responded by yelling, "Oh, you wanna talk
some shit, huh? I can talk some shit, too, mother-fucker." Id. at 1180. At an
altercation involving a separate traffic stop, McCormick protested and was
threatened with arrest for obstruction of official duty. Id. at 1181. At a third
traffic stop, McCormick protested and used a micro-cassette recorder to tape the
officers' comments. An officer forcibly took the device from him, grabbed him,
and placed him under arrest for "disorderly conduct" and "interference with
police duties" although these charges were later dismissed. Id. McCormick
protested yet another traffic stop and videotaped an officer threatening to
arrest him. Id. at 1182. Mr. McCormick eventually survived summary judgment
on many of his § 1983 claims. Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Srnsky, 582
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themselves charged.83 There is also a significant First
Amendment element to some of these cases, in which
criticism or protest of police conduct winds up being treated
as arrestable. 84 But this is not a necessary element. Often
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 2003) (overturning conviction for, inter alia, obstructing an
officer; defendant was one of three brothers involved in a disagreement with
neighbors and refused to give his name to police when asked; court held that
refusal to give one's name to a police officer when asked "standing alone, does
not constitute obstruction").
83. See, e.g., State v. Aloi, 861 A.2d 1180 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). Here,
defendant repeatedly interfered with a fire truck used to pump water to a
neighboring property. Id. at 1182. Though warned to stay away, he did not. An
employee of the neighboring property complained, and police arrived and asked
defendant for identification. Id. Defendant refused, stating "that he did not
need to produce identification, that he was on public property and that 'this
isn't Russia. I'm not showing you any ....
' Id. at 1182-83. Defendant was
arrested, charged with, and convicted of interfering with an officer. The court
reversed his conviction, holding as a matter of statutory construction that
declaratory statements and a refusal to show identification were insufficient to
constitute the crime of interfering with an officer under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a167a (2004). Aloi, 861 A.2d at 1183-84. But see People v. Smith, No. F036729,
2002 WL 1396943 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2002) (upholding conviction for
obstructing an officer where defendant claimed he had been assaulted by
someone, insisted that the officer arrest that individual, and refused to sit down
so the officer could investigate the allegations); Hall v. State, 411 S.E.2d 274
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding conviction of obstruction of a woman who was
stopped for a traffic violation, exited her car, approached the officer's car, and
insisted that "I wasn't speeding, I've done nothing wrong. The only reason you
stopped me is because you're a male chauvinist pig," and refused repeated
requests to produce her driver's license).
84. See, e.g., J.G.D., 724 So. 2d at 711 (J.G.D. failed to obey police command
to leave an apartment complex following his "loud and profane, but . . .nonviolent, protest of police actions" and was arrested and charged with
nonviolently resisting arrest; court ruled that since the order to leave was
unlawful, the arrest was as well and J.G.D.'s resisting without violence was
therefore not unlawful); L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (when police arrested one of L.A.T.'s companions, he screamed, "[i]s
everybody watching this. Police brutality, Rodney King style," and cursed, 'You
fucking cops, what the hell do you think you're doing? You are full of bull
shit. . . . This is abuse."; when L.A.T. did not lower his voice in response to
police direction, he was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct; court
held that L.A.T. was punished for exercising his right to free speech, which,
although offensive, was protected); City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d
808, 809 (N.D. 1991) (overturning conviction for disorderly conduct where
defendant walked past a police car, gestured with his middle finger, and said,
"[flucking, bitching cop," and responded to the officer's follow-up requests with
"[fluck you").
These concerns appear in § 1983 cases as well. See, e.g., Duran v. City of
Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1989) (officer pulled over vehicle when
passenger made obscene gestures at him and yelled profanities in Spanish
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police view the failure to comply with their directionwhether authorized or not-as sufficient to justify arrest.
Police officers in suppression cases routinely testify that,
had the individual in question sought to terminate the
encounter, he would have been free to do so.8 5 In fact,
while driving on a rural highway; court concluded that there was no basis to
stop the vehicle, because the plaintiffs behavior was not a crime, and that it
was particularly troubling if the conduct was a retaliation for Duran's insulting
the officer) ("[Wihile police, no less than anyone else, may resent having obscene
words and gestures directed at them, they may not exercise the awesome power
at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but
protected by the First Amendment."); Kaylor v. Rankin, 356 F. Supp. 2d 839,
844 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (plaintiff was arrested after allegedly calling police officer
an "asshole, a mother f--king asshole" and refusing to provide identification; the
officer's own testimony was that he responded to this comment with, "Do you
want to go to jail?"; Plaintiff was charged with obstructing official business; the
charges were later dismissed); see also Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 892-93
(6th Cir. 2002). The court there reversed a grant of qualified immunity for the
officer who arrested Greene. Greene, a lawyer, went to the Police Department to
retrieve his automobile after it had been towed. Frustrated with the response
he received from the supervisor, Lt. Barber, who Greene believed was being
"arrogant," the following exchange ensued:
Greene: "[Y]ou know, you're really being [an] asshole."
Barber: "You can't talk to me like that in my building."
Greene: "What do you mean I can't talk to you like this in your building....
I'm exercising my freedom of speech.... This is the United States of America
and we have freedom of speech here and if you don't like it you should move to
another country."
Barber: "Well, not in my building[.]"
Greene: "Well, if that's how you feel you're really stupid."
Id. at 892. At that point Barber placed Greene under arrest. Greene resisted
and pepper spray was used to subdue him. Greene was charged with creating a
disturbance and with hindering and opposing a police officer and was acquitted
of both charges. The court held that while Greene's comments were
constitutionally protected, the officer might reasonably have believed he had
probable cause to arrest Greene, but that he could not reasonably have believed
he could do so in retaliation for Greene's exercise of his First Amendment
rights. Id. at 893-98. This was also the concern in City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451 (1987).
85. See, e.g., Guadalupe v. United States, 585 A.2d 1348, 1349 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1991) (officer testified that if persons approached in the train station and
asked if they would answer a few questions refused, "then 'there is nothing you
can do. People walk away,"' and that if persons did so he would make no
attempt to stop them); People v. Dent, 797 N.E.2d 200, 203-05 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (officer approached defendant with no reasonable suspicion as he was
entering a house, said, "Wait a minute," and when the defendant turned, asked
him if he had any drugs on him; when the defendant answered in the negative,
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individuals who decline to cooperate with officers under such
circumstances may instead find themselves charged with
obstruction offenses.8 6 Not only are prosecutions routinely
brought for these offenses, convictions are obtained for
various obstruction offenses predicated on nothing more
than an individual's failure or refusal to do something that
police wanted him to do.87 Numerous appellate decisions
the officer said, "Well, you won't mind me checking" and patted him down,
finding drugs; officer testified that "when he asked the defendant whether he
would submit to a pat-down, the defendant was free to leave").
86. See, e.g., D.T.B. v. State, 892 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(officers wanted to conduct a "voluntary field interview" with D.T.B., which they
testified was a "consensual, citizen encounter"; when police approached D.T.B.,
he ran away; they pursued him and arrested him for obstructing/resisting
arrest without violence).
87. Consider City of Topeka v. Grabauskas, 99 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Kan. App.
Ct. 2004). Police were seeking two teenaged runaways. They saw two young
women walking down the street. The women did not meet the description of the
runaways: the runaways were 12 and 14, while defendant and her sister were
22 and 17; they did not match the description of the runaways in terms of
height, weight, hair color, or clothing. Id. Police asked the young women if they
lived in the area. They indicated that they did and police asked for their names.
"Rather than answering the question the women asked why the officers needed
to know their names." Id. When the officer replied that they "needed to know for
an investigation," defendant answered, "[w]e don't have to tell you shit. Stop
harassing us ....
We don't-We don't have to tell you shit. Leave us fucking
alone." Id. In response, police arrested defendant, breaking her arm in the
process, and charged her with violation of a municipal ordinance preventing
interference with city officers and employees. Id. Defendant was convicted by
the municipal court and her conviction was affirmed by the trial court; not until
she reached the court of appeals was the conviction reversed, on the ground
that, since police had no reasonable suspicion, they had no basis to seize
defendant, who was within her rights in refusing to cooperate, and the state
could not criminalize the defendant's assertion of her Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 1135; see also Aloi, 861 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)
(rejecting state's argument that "a refusal to cooperate" with an officer "is
equivalent to interfering with an officer," and that an individual's refusal to
provide identification on request, coupled with the statement that he did not
need to produce identification, that he was on public property and that 'this
isn't Russia. I'm not showing you any .

. . ."'

constituted the criminal offense of

interfering with an officer); Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (overturning conviction of defendant for "resisting an officer without
violence"; when asked his name, defendant responded "[wihy the fuck you want
my name?" and walked away from officers; court held that because there was no
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, his failure to cooperate did not constitute
resisting an officer); Coley v. State, 344 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that defendant's refusal to comply with officer's orders, when there was no basis
to suspect defendant of a crime, did not constitute the crime of obstruction of an
officer); State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Iowa. Ct. App. 1984)
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demonstrate that trial-level courts routinely permit
conviction for nothing more than the failure to comply with
the requests of police officers.
Given the fact that these offenses are often violations
providing for a comparatively minor sanction and that the
defendants in these cases may not be entitled to counsel, the
volume of appellate cases is likely to be the tip of a
considerably larger iceberg. Furthermore, the fact that an
the
individual's stop or arrest was illegal does not insulate
88
individual from the consequences of that police action. Civil
remedies seem unlikely to address the concerns with the
application of the cooperation statutes to simple failures to
obey.8 9 Moreover, the doctrine of qualified immunity poses
significant barriers to relief in these cases. The qualified
immunity inquiry is two-pronged; the plaintiff must first
show that his constitutional rights were in fact violated,
and next that the right was clearly established at the time
(overturning conviction of defendant for interference with official acts for
refusing to give his name when he happened to be at a private club where a
search warrant was being executed) ("This is not a country where an individual
must present his or her green card and proper papers at the whim of a law
officer, or face jail."); State v. Richmond, 602 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (defendant was uncooperative during a traffic stop; motion to suppress
was granted because search of defendant's person exceeded permissible bounds
of Terry stop; state argued that search could have been incident to lawful arrest
for obstructing legal process "because he did not cooperate with officers when
they asked him questions and searched him"); People v. Offen, 408 N.Y.S.2d
914, 915-16 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1978) (defendant, who "walked away from the
officers and did not heed their request for identification" so they could cite him
for littering, did not commit the crime of obstructing governmental
administration) ("[I]gnoring an officer's request for identification is not a
crime.").
88. See Michigan v. DeFilippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (arrest pursuant to
invalid statute not itself invalid); United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427 (8th
Cir. 1995) (defendant's resistance to arrest was an independent basis for arrest,
even assuming that his initial arrest was unlawful).
89. First, in light of the comparatively minor damages suffered by the
potential plaintiffs, the likelihood of securing contingent-fee counsel to pursue
such cases seems rather remote. It is somewhat surprising to see as many
reported decisions as we do; given that § 1983 actions are unwieldy and expensive
ways to challenge such behaviors, it makes sense that the plaintiffs appear
disproportionately to be lawyers. See, e.g., Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179 (10th
Cir. 2000) (criminal defense attorney who was arrested when he refused to
identify himself while dropping his car off in the early morning at a repair shop;
when the plaintiff left, police pursued him, pulled his vehicle over, and forced
him to his knees when he did not drop to the ground as quickly as the officers
wished).
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of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable officer would
have known about it.90 While the reasonable man-on-thestreet, in the courts' view, is quite knowledgeable, the
reasonable officer subjected to suit under § 1983 seems
remarkably dense. 91

90. See Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Carter v. Anderson, No. Civ.A.6:02-CV-0005BI, 2004 WL
2208488, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (officer's mistaken belief that he could arrest
plaintiff for possession of a suspended driver's license when he was not driving
was not unreasonable). The courts sometimes express the view that it is not
reasonable to expect too much understanding of the law from police officers:
"Circumstances on the beat often require immediate action in order to prevent
serious harm to persons or property; rarely is there time for brushing up on the
Supreme Court's latest pronouncements on warrant requirements, probable cause
or reasonable suspicion." Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.
1989) (explaining this as the justification for the doctrine of qualified immunity).
But see Steinbrecher v. Oswego Police Officer Dickey, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (denying claim of qualified immunity; officers claimed that the
search of plaintiffs backpack was consensual, but plaintiff alleged that officer had
twisted her arm behind her back and pushed her down to the squad car by her
neck; the physical force vitiated any possible voluntary consent, noted the court,
and "[tihis [was] not a point on which a reasonable officer could make a mistake").
Police confusion and uncertainty is rarely reflected as clearly as it was in
Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1179, a § 1983 case. The plaintiff was a criminal defense
attorney who was dropping his car off at a repair shop in the early morning
hours. Id. at 1182. Unbeknownst to him, officers were watching the repair shop
to detect individuals who were dumping bags of motor oil there, and he had
triggered an infrared alarm by driving into the parking lot. Police asked Oliver
for his identification, and he refused to provide it, contending that under the
relevant Utah statute, he only had to identify himself if he was suspected of
wrongdoing. Id. Oliver left the scene in his son's vehicle. Id. at 1183. Police
pursued him, stopped him, forced him to the ground, and placed him under
arrest, telling him to relax. The scene was captured on the officer's video
camera, including Oliver's response: "I can't relax with two ass holes pushing
me around like that. What law did I break?" Id. After Oliver was arrested, the
officers conferred:
Officer Woods: He asked if he'd broken any laws by dropping off his
vehicle, and I told him no.
Officer Scow: He didn't, but he still has to identify himself.
Officer Woods: What code is that?
Officer Scow: I don't know exactly what code it is, to tell you the truth.
Id. at 1183. Oliver was charged with violating the state "stop and identify
statute." Id. at 1183-84. The charge was amended by the prosecutor to a failure
to display motor vehicle registration, and ultimately dismissed by a Justice of
the Peace on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and
therefore that Oliver had no obligation to identify himself. Id. at 1184. The
Court of Appeals in the § 1983 case disagreed, finding, over a dissent, that there
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While in the "right to refuse" context prosecutors argue
that individuals are free to decline officers' requests, in the
obligation to comply context prosecutors contend that the
failure to cooperate with police is a sufficient basis to charge
an individual with a crime. 92 These cases may be brought in
part in an attempt to avoid or defuse possible civil lawsuits. 93
It is also possible that those persons charged with
obstruction offenses are the ones who were not committing
any other crime; if the process of arrest produced
contraband, doubtless the individual would be charged with
a substantive offense rather than the relatively minor
noncooperation offense. The charge of a noncooperation
offense may be the price individuals pay for being both
uncooperative and not guilty. 94 In any event, while most

was reasonable suspicion to stop Oliver and that he therefore had an obligation
to identify himself and was properly arrested for leaving the scene without
doing so. Id. at 1191.
92. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Simpson, 2002-Ohio-4086, No. 80383, 2002
WL 1824975, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2002) (reversing defendant's
conviction for obstructing official business for refusing to open his door at
officers' request; prosecution argued that defendant "did obstruct official
business.., by not cooperating with the police.").
93. In City of Topeka v. Grabauskas, 99 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004), for example, discussed supra note 87, the police broke the defendant's
arm in the course of unlawfully placing her in detention. It is possible that the
municipality thought that charging her and convicting her of a municipal
offense might make the use of force seem more appropriate and minimize the
chance of a civil damages award.
94. In City of Pontiac v. Baldwin, 413 N.W.2d 689, 689-92 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987), for example, police were called to the scene of a domestic dispute in
which, they had been told, two men-Baldwin and his son-were fighting.
When they arrived at the scene, the fight was over. Id. at 690. Police went to
the back of the house to talk to Baldwin, who was sitting in his car preparing to
leave. Id. at 691. Baldwin said he did not wish to talk to them. Police told
Baldwin to stop and get out of the car because they wanted to talk to him. He
yelled that he was leaving. Police opened the car door, forcibly removed Baldwin
from the moving vehicle, and arrested him. Id. Ultimately, Baldwin was
charged with obstructing or hindering a police officer in the discharge of the
officer's duties. Id. at 690. This was a violation under Art. 9, § 16-95 of the
Pontiac City Code. Baldwin was sentenced to thirty days in jail, a $500 fine,
and $250 in costs. Id. The officers testified that they arrested Baldwin because
he "was about to drive away before the officers had completed their
investigation," and for "refusing to cooperate." Id. at 691. The court concluded
that, while Baldwin was properly subjected to a Terry stop, "the police officers
could not compel defendant to answer their questions," and that mere refusal to
cooperate and answer their questions could not rise to the level of obstructing a
police officer. Id. at 691-92. Notwithstanding the court's ultimate resolution, the
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appellate courts protect defendants from ultimate
conviction for failure to comply, the prevalence of cases in
which appellate courts are forced to do so suggests that the
failure to comply with a police request subjects individuals
to likely prosecution, and to the expense, inconvenience,
and stigma of answering the charges. Moreover, the correct
outcome is not a foregone conclusion.
B. Other Recognitions of the Duty to Comply
In the context of the noncooperation statutes, the law
reflects a different tone, and one perhaps more consistent
with our perceptions of refusal to cooperate with police
requests. While ultimately many appellate courts conclude
that failure to cooperate, without more, cannot constitute a
criminal offense in the absence of a level of suspicion
sufficient to compel compliance, they do not demonstrate in
the cooperation context the same enthusiastic endorsement
of the right to refuse. In fact, in other contexts, courts
articulate a duty to assist police in the conduct of their
business which is entirely at odds with the freewheeling
right to refuse that is articulated in the suppression cases.
Courts refer to the duty in a wide range of different
contexts and situations. 95 In the context of malicious
prosecution claims, 96 the courts sometimes assert the

officers plainly believed-and convinced a prosecutor-that the defendant had
committed a crime because he had refused to participate in their inquiry and
answer their questions. See id.; see also People v. Offen, 408 N.Y.S.2d 914, 91416 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1978). Police told the defendant they were going to give
him a summons for littering and demanded identification. Id. at 915. Defendant
ignored the demand and walked away. Id. Defendant was charged with
"obstructing governmental administration." Id. at 914. The court concluded that
ignoring the officer's request was not a crime. Id. at 916. "Were the law
otherwise, it would follow that whenever any barrier is placed in the path of
process and/or arrest, this... misdemeanor.., could be added." Id.
95. In discussing a civil claim brought by an informant against a
municipality and its officers who had negligently disclosed her identity, the
court contended that "[t]he duty of citizens to aid law enforcement" created
public policy that required protection of the anonymity of an informant.
Maynard v. City of Madison, 304 N.W.2d 163, 169 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1981).
96. See, e.g., Downtown Grill, Inc. v. Connell, 721 So. 2d 1113, 1119 (Miss.
1998) ("[T]here is an unspoken civic duty to cooperate with police officers."). The
court's conclusion that the individual in question, an employee of the Downtown
Grill, who had mistakenly identified the defendant as a check forger, had a duty
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principle in support of the argument that a complaining
witness is not liable because "citizens not only have the
right but also the duty to cooperate with law enforcement
'97
authorities in the detection and apprehension of crime.
Sometimes, courts claim that such a duty is created by the
cooperation statutes. 98 The duty is also asserted in the
treatment of private individuals called upon to assist law
enforcement. 99
Ironically, courts sometimes assert the duty to
cooperate even in criminal procedure cases. A claim that
required compliance with police requests amounted to an
arrest, for example, is countered by the contention that
"every citizen has a duty to assist police officers up to the

to cooperate with police made it possible to conclude that he had a qualified
privilege.
97. See McHenry v. Tom Thumb Page Drug Stores, 696 S.W.2d 664, 665
(Tex. App. 1985); see also Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 81 P.3d 244, 258 (Cal.
2004) (upholding absolute privilege to report to police against plaintiffs tort
claim that she was wrongly reported to police as having attempted to cash an
invalid check; court noted earlier precedent, which observed "that it was the
duty of every citizen to cooperate with the police in their investigation of crime
and to provide information to investigating officers").
98. See, e.g., Ottenbacher v. City of Hoquiam, 537 P.2d 862, 863-64 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1975). Mrs. Ottenbacher called the police to report a domestic
disturbance, but when the police came to the scene, she attempted to leave. Id.
at 863. Police insisted that she get in their car and return to her mother's home
until police completed their investigation. Plaintiff sued for false imprisonment.
Id. The court rejected her claim on the ground that plaintiff's failure to
cooperate with the investigation constituted a misdemeanor offense of
obstruction. Id. at 863-64. The statute, which provided that
[e]very person who, after due notice, shall refuse or neglect to make or
furnish any statement, report or information lawfully required of him
by any public officer,... or who shall willfully hinder, delay or obstruct
any public officer in the discharge of his official powers or duties, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor,
imposed a "legal duty upon plaintiff to cooperate with the police," and her
refusal justified her lawful detention. Id. at 854.
99. See Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2002). Lykins, a private
citizen, attempted to assist Ridgway in subduing an arrestee; the arrestee died
as a result. Id. at 503. Plaintiff sought to bring a § 1983 claim against Lykins.
The court noted that an individual's rendering "brief, ad hoc assistance to a
public officer" did not turn him into a state actor. Id. "To assist the police is a
duty of citizenship; and the performance of a duty to someone does not turn the
performer into that someone." Id. at 508.
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point of self-incrimination."' 100 A defendant's claim that he
was placed in custody, and therefore should have received
Miranda warnings, may be answered by the claim that the
individual was not in custody, but was simply complying
with his duty as a citizen to cooperate with law
enforcement. 101 Prosecutors have even argued-sometimes
successfully!-that such a duty exists in the consensual
encounter context, requiring individuals to cooperate when
police ask them questions. 0 2 Courts sometimes mention
100. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 500 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
("The assumption that an individual is required to cooperate with the police
cannot be equated with an arrest since every citizen has a duty to assist police
officers up to the point of self-incrimination."); People v. Miller, 412 N.E.2d 175,
179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("[P]olice officers may question citizens during criminal
investigations. Citizens have a duty to cooperate with the police in these
investigations."); Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d 371, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(concluding that an encounter in which police approached two individuals did
not constitute arrest; "[w]e have in past cases commented on the duty of every
person to cooperate with police and to respond unless a Fifth Amendment claim
is involved."); Malone v. State, 361 So. 2d 674, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("No
arrest occurred when the appellant was taken to police headquarters. The
assumption that 'one is required to cooperate with the police can hardly be
equated with an arrest, every citizen has a duty to assist police officers up to a
point of self-incrimination."').
101. See, e.g., People v. Myrick, 651 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Myrick
claimed he was arrested when he was taken in for questioning about the death
of an infant, and that the police at the time lacked probable cause for an arrest.
Id. The court rejected his claim, viewing his behavior as that of a "good citizen
cooperating in an investigation," who went "voluntarily to the police station,"
and stated, "[e]very citizen has a duty to cooperate with the police up to the
point of self-incrimination." Id. at 642-43 (quoting People v. Jackson, 500
N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)); see also People v. Johnson, 544 N.E.2d 392,
400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("The assumption that an individual is required to
cooperate with the police cannot be equated with an arrest since every citizen
has a duty to assist police officers up to the point of self-incrimination."); People
v. Holmes, 626 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ("As every citizen has a duty
to assist police officers up to the point of self-incrimination, an assumption that
one is required to cooperate with the police can hardly be equated with an
arrest."); Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.)
(same); United States v. Calhoun, 363 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C. App. 1976) (same).
102. See People v. Dent, 797 N.E.2d 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). A number of
police officers approached defendant without any articulable suspicion as he
was entering a home and stated, "[w]ait a minute." Id. at 207. Defendant
turned, was asked if he had drugs on him, and when he responded that he did
not, was subjected to a frisk that revealed cannabis. Id. The defendant argued
that he had been unlawfully seized and that the drugs should be suppressed;
the officer testified that this was a consensual encounter and that the defendant
was free to leave. Id. The trial court held that a reasonable person under the
circumstances would have believed himself to be detained. Id. The State, on
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this duty in a wide range of other cases as well, from
employment cases, 10 3 to takings claims, 0 4 to claims of
evidentiary privilege. 10 5 In any event, an individual
scouring legal rulings for evidence that he had an obligation
to obey police officers would find some significant support
for such a contention. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
ventured the view that "private citizens have a duty to
to law enforcement officials when it is
provide assistance
6
required." 0
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH GAMESMANSHIP
The test defining the consensual encounter has been
widely criticized. One could argue that there is nothing
wrong with the articulated test, only with its application.
The test, as applied, posits that reasonable individuals feel
free to decline a wide range of police encounters. As we have
appeal, argued that this was a community caretaking activity, that "citizens
have a duty to cooperate," and therefore that "the defendant had a duty to
assist the police in their investigation of these reports." Id. at 209. The court
suppressed the evidence notwithstanding the state's argument. Id.
103. See, e.g., Ky. Farmers Bank v. Nutter, No. 85-CA-2279-MR, 1987 WL
194726, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 15, 1987) (wrongful discharge case where
plaintiff claimed she was fired because she had assisted local law enforcement
officials in a sting; "the public policy of this Commonwealth requires that 'a
person assist a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties"; the
fact that plaintiff had a duty to so act made discharge an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine); cf. id. at *5 (Gudgel, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to
the majority's holding, it is settled that private citizens in this state do not have
a general duty to assist law enforcement officials in enforcing the provisions of
the penal code.").
104. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing
possibility that plaintiff could assert a takings claim when the city seized his
car as evidence of a crime as to which he was the victim, required him to pay
towing and storage charges for the car, and spray-painted large numbers on the
vehicle, diminishing its value). A concurring judge noted that "[s]ome courts
have ruled, at least in the context of relatively limited retentions of property,
that nothing legally cognizable has been 'taken' from the plaintiff because all
citizens have a duty to assist the police." Id. at 475-76 (Wood, J., concurring).
105. See United States v. Leslie, No. 402CR039, 2002 WL 32059743, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 4, 2002) (privilege of withholding names of confidential
informants "recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their
knowledge of criminal activity to law enforcement officers. By preserving the
anonymity of informants, it encourages persons to perform this obligation and
cooperate with the police.").
106. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175-76 n.24 (1977).
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seen, the reasonableness standard applied by the courts in
the consensual encounter context fails to take into account
several significant facts: that noncompliance sometimes
results in physical compulsion; that failure to obey even a
consensual request can subject an individual to prosecution
for violation of a noncooperation statute; that elsewhere a
duty to cooperate with law enforcement has been articulated
as a principle of positive law; and that whether compliance is
obligatory or voluntary may turn on facts-the existence of
reasonable suspicion-known only to the officer at the time
of the encounter.
Yet, viewed in the context of the gamesmanship model,
the test not only may produce erroneous results, but has
structural problems that are of more profound concern.
A. Advocacy of Noncooperation
The gamesmanship model views defendants' loss of
rights as their own responsibility. As we have seen, the way
that is accomplished in the context of the consensual
encounter is to argue that, in the ordinary course, reasonable
people have-and believe that they have-the right to
disregard the police, ignore their requests, and refuse to
cooperate with them. Compliance with police thus becomes
the product not of compulsion or submission to police
authority, but of individual acquiescence. This minimizes
suppression. It also, at least in the short run, may have
comparatively little impact on the degree of compliance with
police requests. It is nonetheless troubling that this principle
of law requires courts and prosecutors to routinely articulate
the view that people are free to refuse to cooperate with
police. Moreover, the gamesmanship model means that
cooperators should blame their loss of constitutional rights
on their own foolish desire to engage in cooperative and
socially appropriate behavior. One might be concerned that,
over time, such norms of cooperation and compliance will
erode in the face of the persistent judicial message that such
compliance is not required, and is, moreover, a mistake. 10 7 In

107. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(overturning conviction of possession of cocaine where the government claimed
a consent search; court found that police direction with regard to the search of
the interior of defendant's mouth went beyond the scope of defendant's consent).
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the long run, society is not benefited by a pervasive
insistence not only that individuals are free to disregard
police requests, but that the most savvy citizens regularly do
so. The system's own discomfort with the principle is
reflected in the very different attitude taken towards the
question of noncooperation in situations other than
suppression.
B. Focus on Individual Behavior, Not Police Behavior
The law of consensual encounters, defined as it is in
terms of the expectations of the hypothetical "reasonable
person" in her interactions with police, inevitably causes the
courts to focus on the behavior of individuals rather than
police. The question is not whether the police should have
behaved differently, but whether, under the circumstances,
the defendant should have. The standard, as articulated,
affirmatively disregards any sense that the courts should
play a significant role in articulating the appropriate
constitutional boundaries of police behavior.
At least this is what the courts say they are doing. What
they are actually doing is more complicated and, I would
argue, harmonizes more effectively with the more proactive
role the courts should take in governing police conduct.
C. A Better Approach: Police Overreaching
Courts typically do two things in the consensual
encounter cases that are inconsistent with a "reasonable
person" test. First, they disregard factors that, while they
may be characteristics of the reasonable person, are not the
fault of the police. For example, while people may feel some
We fear that similar situations will arise in the future, perhaps
because most citizens hold it to be their duty to cooperate with law
enforcement, a belief with which we join. But once engaged in the
process, few citizens know the boundaries that law enforcement may
not legally exceed or the means to stop conduct they may perceive to be
unduly intrusive. . . . Thus, ignorance of one's rights may lead to a
denial of those rights.
Id. Noted the concurrence: "Citizens should be encouraged to cooperate with
such encounters. The methods demonstrated in this case, however, by which an
initial encounter subtly evolves into an oral cavity search, serve to discourage
reasonable, law-abiding citizens from cooperating during a field interrogation."
Id. at 716 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
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inherent compulsion to obey the police, that compulsion is
not taken into account in assessing the reasonable person's
response to police authority.108 The tendency of the
reasonable individual to obey police direction is not a factor
that the courts are willing to consider in assessing how the
reasonable person would behave. This is the case even
though such a tendency is plainly relevant, as a
characteristic of the reasonable person, to a true reasonable
person inquiry. Second, they look to factors that reflect the
level of authority exerted by police: the display of weapons,
the show of force reflected in the deployment of multiple
officers, and so forth. While such demonstrations might be
relevant to the views of the reasonable person's perception of
his freedom to decline the officer's requests, the courts do not
necessarily limit their consideration of these factors to how
the reasonable person would understand them. Instead, they
treat the facts as relevant to the propriety of the officer's
action under the circumstances. Courts, while articulating
the reasonable person test, are asking not only how a
reasonable person would react to a situation, but whether
the situation constituted a reasonable exercise of the officer's
authority. De facto, the courts seem to be considering not
only whether a reasonable person under the circumstances
would feel that compliance was required, but whether police
have done something inappropriate to create that
impression.
There is an obvious-but unstated-analogy here to the
due process voluntariness standard applied to the
admissibility of confessions. 10 9 In assessing whether a
person's statement to police was involuntary and should be
suppressed as a matter of due process, the Supreme Court
has held, it is not enough that the statement be involuntary
in the sense that it is not the product of the affirmative will
108. See, e.g., People v. Tweedy, No. 04CA0037, 2005 WL 2680540 (Col. Ct.
App. 2005) ("Any inherent social pressure defendant may have felt to cooperate
with the police was not a sufficient basis for concluding that the encounter
constituted a seizure."); see also United States v. Ayon-Meza, 177 F.3d 1130,
1133 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]here is an element of psychological inducement when a
representative of the police-even unarmed and in civilian clothes ... initiates
a conversation. But it is not the kind of psychological pressure that leads,
without more, to an involuntary stop."); Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 155
(Colo. 2001) ("Inherent social pressure to cooperate with the police is not itself a
sufficient basis for declaring the encounter non-consensual.").
109. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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of the speaker. For a statement to be involuntary under the
due process clause, it must be the product of police
overreaching. 110 In the context of the due process cases, of
course, asking whether there has been police overreaching
makes more confessions admissible; a pure voluntariness
standard would exclude confessions that the existing
standard will admit. In the consensual encounter context, by
contrast, requiring the courts to scrutinize the encounters for
police overreaching rather than merely for voluntariness
might produce a different result.
In fact, the courts in the consensual encounter cases
appear to be seeking a similar test. The question they seek to
ask is whether the police engaged in conduct which
unreasonably compelled the individual in question to obey or
comply. It is not enough that the individual feels compelled
to comply to create a seizure. The police officer must
affirmatively do something to create a coercive environment
for a seizure to arise. Merely taking advantage of the
fortuitous existence of an internally driven compulsion is
insufficient."' The courts seem to be confusing a
reasonableness-based standard-which turns on the
characteristics of the reasonable person in the defendant's

110. See id. at 167.
111. See, e.g., People v. Lippert, No. E034959, 2005 WL 1539584, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 30, 2005) ("Despite defendant's repeated claims that he felt that
he could not leave the hospital or disregard the officers' requests, the officers'
words or actions would not have caused a reasonable person to feel such
restraint."); see also United State v. Ramirez, 172 F.3d 880 (Table), No. 97-2347,
1999 WL 100891, at *1-3 (10th Cir. Mar. 1, 1999). An officer boarded a bus on
which Ramirez was a passenger at a fixed border checkpoint. Id. at *1. Because
Ramirez appeared nervous, the officer "asked Ramirez to step off the bus and
into a nearby checkpoint trailer for further questioning." Id. The officer's
request for Ramirez to submit to a patdown revealed cocaine taped to his legs.
Id. at *2. The court concluded that it did not even need to consider whether the
removal of Ramirez from the bus for questioning was supported by any level of
objective suspicion, because "Ramirez consented to this questioning." Id. at *5.
The basis on which the court concluded that this encounter was entirely
consensual was that '[a]t no time was Mr. Ramirez threatened or coerced,"'
that the officer used a "normal tone of voice" in asking Ramirez to leave the bus,
that the officer "did not brandish his weapon, use aggressive language, or
physically touch Ramirez when he asked Ramirez to disembark," that "he did
not threaten" Ramirez, and that Ramirez "knew he was not under arrest" while
he was on the bus. Id. at *5-6 (alteration in original). The appellate court
concluded "that a reasonable person who was not carrying contraband could
have believed that he was free to decline Davila's request to disembark and
submit to further questioning." Id. at *6.
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situation-for a misconduct-based standard, requiring some
police overreaching in order to find that there has been a
seizure. This implicit standard may have developed because
the courts view a true reasonableness standard, which
includes consideration of the socially-imposed compulsion to
comply with police authority, as inconsistent with enabling
law enforcement to do its job.112 Consistent with this
approach, courts view the circumstances that create
seizures-that tend to suggest to an individual that he is
not free to decline a request-as circumstances that suggest
that he is compelled by police conduct to comply." 3
112. Noted one court:
It might perhaps be contended that all of this is unduly formalistic and
does not give sufficient play to the natural tendency of any person-the
wholly innocent individual as well as someone transporting
contraband-to feel somewhat cowed when a law enforcement officer
approaches and begins to ask questions, particularly those probing into
the possibility of illegal activity. But even apart from the difficulties
that a more restrictive approach would pose for entirely legitimate law
enforcement efforts, it is too late in the day-the law is too firmly
established-to convert that notion into a more demanding test for the
legality of a noncustodial encounter with an officer.
United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2004). Police came to Abdenbi's
home at 6:15 a.m. and requested entry so they could speak with someone who
lived inside. They were admitted, and asked defendant to come out of his
bedroom and speak with them. Defendant admitted he was in the United States
illegally, and was arrested. Defendant argued that the consent to enter the
apartment was involuntary "because no reasonable person ever feels free to
decline an officer's request for permission to enter or search." Id. at 1288. The
court declined to accept this proposition "because it would have the practical
effect of preventing all district courts in this circuit from ever finding that an
individual's cooperation with law enforcement officials was voluntary." Id.
113. E.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("Examples
of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not
attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
the officer's request might be compelled."). This language has been widely
adopted in determining when a reasonable individual would not feel free to
decline a request by police. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25 (1st
Cir. 2005); United States v. Peters, 194 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 1999); State v.
Baker, 107 P.3d 1214, 1215 (Idaho 2004). Accordingly, courts tend to look to
whether the police engaged in coercive activity, rather than to whether
reasonable individuals under the circumstances would have felt coerced. See,
e.g., In re S.D., No. A107548, 2005 WL 1274449, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 27,
2005) ("It may be that the circumstances before us would be intimidating to an
innocent reasonable person, but that is because encounters between uniformed
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The court's desire for such a standard should be
explicitly acknowledged. In the consensual encounter
context, courts should apply a test that asks whether the
conduct of the officers in question was reasonable in an
interaction with a person as to whom there was no
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Such a standard
would turn the inquiry into one about police conduct rather
than citizen behavior. More importantly, it would stop
requiring police, government and the courts to repeatedly
articulate the view that individuals interested in protecting
their constitutional rights should routinely refuse and reject
cooperation with police officers. In the long run, such a rule
is more conducive to socially desirable behavior on the part
of all participants in the criminal justice system.

police officers and juveniles late at night in dark parking lots are inherently
intimidating, not because of any affirmative coercive actions on the part of the
police."). In concluding that there has been no seizure, courts tend to mention
facts like the fact that officers did not have their guns drawn. See, e.g., id.; Stith
v. Commonwealth, No. 2394-03-2, 2005 WL 41529 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005).

